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EFFICIENT AND SUITABLE PROVISION FOR
THE TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE
SYSTEM: AN IMPOSSIBLE DREAM?
Joe Ball*

EMEMBER Rodriguez! Remember Edgewood! Remember the
Alamo! It is quite fitting that the battle over public school finance in
the grand state of Texas should have started and continued in the
San Antonio area, home of historic battle sites.1 Whereas the battle for
Texas Independence in 1836 lasted less than a year, the battle over the funding of Texas public schools has lasted twenty-five years. 2 When the battle
began it involved the wealthy property districts versus the poor property
districts. But, as war and politics make strange bedfellows, the most recent
twist in the finance battle involves the formation of a rich-poor district coalition dedicated to: (1) making the state fund "a substantial majority of the
expenses of a basic education;" '3 (2) achieving "equity, adequacy, and quality" for the students of the state; 4 and (3) maintaining local control, parental involvement, and district program enrichment "once an efficient system
has otherwise been established."'
A person might think the analogy to battle a bit strong until he surveyed
the public school finance terminology and concepts, which include the recapturing of funds (the "Robin Hood" plan), the caps on revenue raising,
the right to control schools locally, the power to tax, and the legislative duty
to provide an adequate education to all the citizens of its state. The catchy
phrases and lofty ideas should not, however, obscure the three basic questions for battle analysis: (1) How much money needs to be spent on public
* In memory of the greatest educator in my life, Billie Jean Ball.
1. Demetrio Rodriguez in 1968 questioned the fairness of Texas public school finance by
seeking greater funding for his children's school district located in the San Antonio area. This
property-poor school district, Edgewood I.S.D., would later become the focal point for a second challenge starting in 1984. JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN
AMERICAN SCHOOLS 214 (1991).
2. Id. at 223. At the time of the announcement of the Texas Supreme Court's Edgewood
I holding that the Texas public school finance system violated the state constitution,
Edgewood I.S.D. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989), Demetrio Rodriguez was no longer a
father but a grandfather of children attending Edgewood I.S.D. schools. He spoke to a crowd
at a local high school, "I cried this morning because this is something that has been in my
heart .... My children will not benefit from it .... Twenty-one years is a long time to wait."
Id. at 226 (quoting SAN ANTONIO ExPRESs-NEwS, Oct. 3, 1989).
3. Rich-PoorDistrictCoalition Emerging, NEWS & NOTES (Equity Center, Austin, Tex.)
June 1991, at 6.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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education? (2) From what sources can the money be raised? and (3) How
should the money be divided among those being educated? In other words,
what method of taxation should be used to generate an adequate amount of
public school revenue for efficient or equitable distribution to the students of
6
Texas?
As noted earlier, the original adversaries in the school finance litigation
have blurred as rich and poor school districts fight together for adequate as
well as equitable funding of the state's public schools. In addition, the
Supreme Court of Texas and the Texas legislature are embroiled in a constitutional battle over the proper financing of the public schools. The court
seeks to hold the legislature to its constitutional duty to make "suitable provision" for "an efficient system of public free schools" while the legislature
endeavors to meet those vague standards without overburdening the state's
7
taxpayers or offending the constituents of wealthier districts.
Due to the extensive and thoughtful commentary that has preceded this
Comment on (1) the Edgewood litigation, (2) the framers' intent when drafting the Texas Constitution's education articles, and (3) the funding options
available to the Texas legislature,8 this paper will focus primarily on the
interplay between the first two supreme court decisions in Edgewood and the
resulting legislation. Section I provides a summary of what has transpired
from the beginning of the Edgewood litigation through the Texas Supreme
6. Issues involving the equality of tax burdens, adequate education funding, and equitable distribution of state and local revenue have a rich legislative history in Texas over the last
eighty years. See generally William P. Hobby, Jr. & Billy D. Walker, Legislative Reform of the
Texas Public School FinanceSystem, 1973-1991, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 379 (1991) (former
Texas Lieutenant Governor and current director of Texas Association of School Boards outline legislative finance reform from 1909-1990).
7. Edgewood I.S.D. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) [hereinafter Edgewood I].
8. See Albert H. Kauffman & Carmen Maria Bumbaut, Applying Edgewood v. Kirby to
Analysis of Fundamental Rights Under the Texas Constitution, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 69 (1990)
(lead attorneys for Edgewood plaintiffs describing Edgewood I litigation from district court to
court of appeals to supreme court, including legal theories to challenge school finance
schemes); see also Julie K. Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School FinanceLitigation: A
New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517, 520 (1991) (discussing the three

prevailing litigation challenges in school finance cases, two based on equal protection and the
other based on the state's education article); Allan E. Parker, Jr., Public FreeSchools: A ConstitutionalRight to Educational Choice in Texas, 45 Sw. L.J. 825 (1991) (in-depth historical
analysis of the Texas Constitution's education article concluding that the framer's intent supports movement to establish educational choice in Texas); Mikal Watts & Brad Rockwall, The
OriginalIntent of the Education Article of the Texas Constitution, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 771, 820
(1990) (emphasizing framer's intent under TEX. CoNsT. art. VII, § 1, for the legislature to be
judicially held to its duty to create and maintain efficient schools that protect a citizen's right
to education); Becky Stern, Comment, JudicialPromulgationof Legislative Policy: Efficiency
at the Expense of Democracy, 45 Sw. L.J. 977 (1991) (tracing the development of the Texas
Constitution education articles and the legislatures' attempts to enact the constitutional requirements, concluding that the current court intervention oversteps the judicial boundaries of
power); Bernard Lau, Note, Edgewood I.S.D. v. Kirby: A Political Question?, 43 BAYLOR L.
REV. 187, 203 (1991) (suggesting centralized funding at the state level with option for local
enrichment, tempering potential inequities by statewide open enrollment); Robert L. Manteuffel, Comment, The Quest for Efficiency: Public School Funding in Texas, 43 Sw. L.J. 1119,
1128 (1990) (outlining four common funding options: increased state aid, district power equalizing, full state funding, and the voucher system); A. Thomas Stubbs, Note, After Rodriguez:
Recent Developments in School FinanceReform, 44 TAX LAW. 313, 328 (1990) (analyzing the
efficiency mandate in Edgewood I and the resulting funding scheme enacted by the legislature).
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Court's third ruling on public school finance, including the first two legislative responses to the supreme court's rulings. 9 Section II analyzes the question of efficiency in the public school finance system. Included in this section

is a discussion of the three-tiered system of state and local funding for public
education, the newly-created County Education Districts (CEDs), the recapture or "Robin Hood" operation of the CEDs, and the revenue limit, or cap,

on local funding. Section III analyzes the question of suitability, or adequacy, in the public school finance system. This section discusses the state

and local share of education funding, the state's option to restructure revenue through a state income tax (personal or business), and the local school

districts' desire to enrich their educational programs. Throughout sections
II and III, the legislature's two most recent school finance schemes are compared and contrasted. Special emphasis is placed on how well the schemes
achieved or failed to achieve the constitutional requirements of efficiency

and suitability. Finally, Section IV concludes the article.

9. On November 10, 1992, Governor Richards called a lame-duck special session to address the need for the passage of a new school finance plan prior to the Texas Supreme Court's
deadline of June 1, 1993. Terrence Stutz, Governor Touts Plansfor Schools, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 10, 1992, at Al; see infra text and accompanying notes 124-29. The Democratic leadership announced a proposed "Fair Share" plan that would redistribute funds from
property-rich to property-poor districts at about the same level under the 1991 school finance
plan. Wayne Slater & Terrence Stutz, School Proposal Unveiled, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 5, 1992, at All; see infra text and accompanying notes 217-41. Instead of using County
Education Districts (CEDs) to accomplish the redistribution, the plan called for property-rich
school districts to contribute more money to the Texas Teacher Retirement System so that the
state could correspondingly lessen its contribution to the retirement system and transfer the
savings to property-poor districts. Wayne Slater & Terrence Stutz, School Proposal Unveiled,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 5, 1992, at All.
The proposed plan's redistribution of local property taxes along with a 95% equity funding
standard were to be submitted to the voters of Texas as an amendment to the constitution. Id.;
see e.g. infra note 206. The proposal failed to survive the special session because Texas House
Republicans united together to block the two-thirds vote required for the approval of a constitutional amendment. Terrence Stutz & Christy Hoppe, GOP Fails to Offer School Fund Plan,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 25, 1992, at Al. Throughout the session, the political parties
and the educational bureaucracy pointed fingers at one another for failing to begin the process
towards creating an acceptable, constitutional plan prior to the June 1, 1993 deadline which
Judge McCown has pledged to enforce through an injunction against state funding of Texas
schools. Id.; see also infra note 34.
Sandwiched in the middle of the talk about redistribution and equity, the state leaders announced that about $3 billion promised by the state under the 1991 finance plan would not be
available for the 1993-94 biennium. Melanie Lewis, FairShare School Plan Criticized, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 6, 1992, at Al0. Critics of the state's efforts stressed that due to
increases in enrollment local districts would be forced to increase property taxes in an attempt
to simply maintain current levels of spending. Wayne Slater & Terrence Stutz, School Proposal
Unveiled, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 5, 1992, at A11. Neither political party addressed

the inadequacy of the state's funding of Texas public schools, continuing the trend of overreliance on the local property tax to solve the efficiency problem. See infra text and accompanying notes 274-350. With the clear inadequacy of the current state tax structure to handle the
financing of public schools, "conservative" voices opined that the state income tax should be
seriously considered as an alternative to the funding of Texas schools instead of the increasingly burdensome property tax. Rena Penderson, The Texas School Hijacking, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 15, 1992, at J2.
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HISTORY OF EDGEWOOD LITIGATION AND RESULTING
LEGISLATION

At the heart of the controversy of the public school finance battle in Texas
is the educational establishment clause from the constitution of 1876.10 After 115 years, article VII, section 1, still provides: "A general diffusion of
knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of
people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and
make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.""
The historic United States Supreme Court decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez' 2 set the stage for the current challenges to the funding of public schools using the education articles of state
constitutions.' 3 In 1968, Demetrio Rodriguez, whose children were enrolled
in Edgewood Independent School District, brought suit in federal district
court to have Texas' system for funding public education declared a violation of the United States Constitution. 14 Mr. Rodriguez and other concerned parents of children attending Edgewood schools complained that the
funding disparities between property-poor and property-rich school districts
violated the Equal Protection Clause.' 5 The plaintiffs argued that equitable
funding would create educational opportunities for their children that were
already enjoyed by children in wealthier districts. Once the state offered all
children equally-funded educational foundations, then the students in the
property-poor districts could better compete for college and employment positions. 16 The plaintiffs prevailed in the district court, but the victory proved
to be short lived when the United States Supreme Court held that education
was not a fundamental right "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution."
The Court's decision in Rodriguez significantly limited any future hope
that funding disparities arising from variances in locally raised revenue
could be challenged in federal court.'s Consequently, the battle over school
finance shifted to the state arena, with plaintiffs seeking to show that funding
systems violated some provision of a state's constitution. 19
'7

10. See Parker, supra note 8, at 831; Watts & Rockwall, supra note 8, at 791; Stem, supra
note 8, at 984.
11. TEX. CONST. art VII, § 1.
12. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
13. See generally Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self Government: The Right to Education Under State ConstitutionalLaw, 18 J. L. & EDUC. 93, 134-140 (1989) (appendix to article
contains the education provisions of the fifty states' constitutions).
14. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971),
rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
15. See generally Lau, supra note 8, at 191-195 (discussing plaintiff's challenges to the
Texas finance system under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution).
16. See KOZOL, supra note 1, at 206, 214.
17. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-34.
18. See generally Underwood & Sparkman, supra note 8, at 521-29 (analyzing federal
equal protection challenges to public school finance systems, including treatment of cases subsequent to Rodriguez).
19. See id. at 529, 532.
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EDGEWOOD I

In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court reserved questions involving "state taxation and education . . .for the legislative processes of the

various States."'20 However, the Court also admonished states like Texas to
reform their funding systems in order "to assure both a higher level of qual'2 1
ity and greater uniformity of opportunity.
From 1975 until 1984,22 the Texas legislature experimented with increasing state aid to its Foundation School Program 23 as a means of equalizing
funding among school districts. 24 The property-poor school districts believed that the legislature's attempts to resolve the funding disparities
amounted to a trail of broken promises that failed "to ensure that every child
in the state ha[d] an equal opportunity to get a first rate education. '25 Consequently, Edgewood I.S.D. filed suit with sixty-seven other property-poor
school districts in state district court alleging that the public school finance
26
system violated Texas constitutional provisions.
In 1987, Judge Harley Clark of the 250th Judicial District Court of Travis
County held for the plaintiffs by finding that the funding system violated the
equal protection, the due process of law, and the education establishment
clauses of the Texas Constitution. 27 The court of appeals reversed, concluding "that which is, or is not, 'efficient' [under Art. VII, section 1] is essentially a political question not suitable for judicial review."' 28 The dissent
emphasized education as a constitutional right "critical to an individual's
20. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58.
21. Id.
22. For a timeline of the changing foundation programs, see Edgewood ISD v. Kirby - A
Chronology of the Texas Public School FinanceBattle at a Glance, TEXAS LONE STAR, Apr.May 1991, at 10.
23. A foundation school program establishes a minimum per-pupil spending level that
will provide "a resource level sufficient for students to succeed personally and occupationally."
JAMES W. GUTHRIE & RODNEY J. REED, EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY 112

(1986).

24. To equalize funding levels among districts, the state raises the level of the legislatively
decided "foundation" and then makes up the difference between the foundation level and the
amount the property-poor school districts can raise at the required tax effort. For example,
State X raises its foundation level from $3000 to $4500 per student. To be assured of receiving
that basic allotment, each school district must tax at the hypothetical statutory minimum of
$1.00 per $100 property valuation. District Rich can raise $10,000 per student and District
Poor can raise $1000 per student. Whether the foundation level is $3000 or $4500, District
Rich gets nothing from the state because its $10,000 covers and even exceeds the foundation.
However, the state's supplement to District Poor's $1000 local revenue increases from $2000
to $3500 as a result of the increased foundation. See id.
25. William E. Camp & David C. Thompson, School FinanceLitigation: Legal Issues and
Politics of Reform, 14 J. EDUC. FIN. 221, 224-25 (1988). Jose A. Cardenas and James R.

Vasquez, former and present Superintendents of Edgewood I.S.D., believed that the Texas
legislature would not upset the politically protected status quo of funding disparities without
legal challenges. Id. at 225.
26. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 391.
27. Id. at 392. The Texas Supreme Court cited the corresponding provisions: TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1. Id.
28. Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 867 (Tex. App.-Austin
1988), rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). See also Stem, supra note 8, at 996 (concluding that
implementation of an "efficient" school system financing plan constitutes a nonjustifiable political question).
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participation in today's society" which should be offered on "a relatively
'29
equal basis with others."
In 1989, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and declared that the current educational funding system violated the education
article of the state constitution.30 The court limited this Edgewood I holding
to the "efficiency" provision of the Texas Constitution, finding that "we need
not consider petitioners' other constitutional arguments." ' 31 Although the

court stated that it would "not now instruct the legislature as to the specifics
of the legislation it should enact,"' 32 the opinion clearly articulated the constitutionally-derived mandate for an efficient finance system: "There must be

a direct and close correlation between a district's tax effort and the educational resources available to it; in other words, districts must have substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax
effort."

'33

B.

THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO EDGEWOOD I

The May 1, 1990, deadline set by the Supreme Court of Texas in
Edgewood I for legislative restructuring of the public school finance system
passed without an enacted plan. 34 At the district court level, Judge Scott
McCown, who replaced Judge Clark in the case after Clark's resignation,
threatened to impose "a court-ordered plan to redistribute state public education aid" if the legislature did not act by June 21, 1991.35 The political
forces in Austin, Texas, wrangled over the school finance issues for three
special sessions, fighting over how much more money would be put into public education and how to generate the revenue for the cost associated with
equalization. 36 On June 7, 1990, Governor Bill Clements signed Senate Bill
1,37 the Texas Legislature's overdue answer to Edgewood I and the financing
29. Kirby, 761 S.W.2d at 875 (Gammage, J., dissenting). The dissent also rejected the
majority's political question rationale: "[w]hat may be 'suitable' is a proper subject for legislative political debate and decision; but the system resulting from that process must be 'efficient'
enough to preserve protected constitutional rights in accordance with necessary, discernible
and manageable legal standards. Id. (citing Mumme v. Marrs, 40 S.W.2d 31, 36-37 (1931))
(emphasis added).
30. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397. "We hold that the state's school financing system is
neither financially efficient nor efficient in the sense of providing for a 'general diffusion of
knowledge' statewide, and therefore that it violates article VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution." Id.
31. Id. at 398.
32. Id. at 399.
33. Id. at 397.
34. Id. at 399. The Texas Supreme Court stayed the effect of the district court's September 1,1989 injunction until May 1, 1990 to give the Texas legislature time to enact a remedy
"long overdue." Id. For a reprint of the text of the original injunction issued by Judge Harley
Clark, see Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, No. 362516 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County,
250th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Sept. 24, 1990), vacated in part, 804 S.W.2d 491, 498 n. 16 (Tex.
1991).
35. HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, WRAP-UP OF THE 1990 SPECIAL SESSIONS ON
PUBLIC EDUCATION 21 (1990) [hereinafter HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION].
36. See Jennifer Wong, Reschooling Texas, THE TEXAS OBSERVER, Feb. 22, 1991, at 16.
37. Act of June 6, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (referred to in
the text as Senate Bill 1), amended by Act of Apr. 11, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 20, 1991 Tex.
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of public schools. 38
The legislation avoided placing caps on local revenue-raising and did not
attempt to redistribute locally-raised revenue from rich to poor school districts.39 Instead, the act raised the level of per-pupil expenditure for which
the state equalized funding. 4° The state financed the 1990-91 $528 million
price tag of Senate Bill 1 by mixing together sales and sin tax increases,
budget cuts, and "rainy day" fund appropriations. 4 1
C.

EDGEWOOD I

In July 1990, the plaintiffs returned to state district court complaining
that Senate Bill 1 "failed to provide substantially equal access to funds of all
the state's students, failed to create a priority allocation of state funds to
education and failed to curb 'unequalized enrichment' of educational funding by local districts."'42 The defendants, represented by the Attorney General's office, argued that "absolute equity" would be "prohibitively
expensive" for the state to guarantee, considering the per-pupil level of
spending of wealthy districts. 4 3 In September 1990, the district court found
that the finance plan enacted by Senate Bill 1 did not effect a change in the
"finance system condemned in Edgewood I," thereby continuing the legisla44
ture's failure to meet its constitutional obligation.
Gen. Laws 381 (referred to in the text as Senate Bill 351),further amended by Act of May 27,
1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 391, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1475 (referred to in text as House Bill

2885). Senate Bill 1 amended finance provisions of the education code barely one year old, Act
of May 29, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 816, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 3732 (referred to in text as
Senate Bill 1019).
38. See generally Stubbs, supra note 8, at 328 (discussing the efficiency mandate in

Edgewood I and the resulting funding scheme enacted by the legislature).
39. HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, supra note 35, at 2.
40. Senate Bill 1 retained the two-tiered foundation program put into effect by Senate Bill
1019. In 1989-90 under Senate Bill 1019, school districts received an unadjusted basic allotment of $1477 per weighted student at a tax rate of $0.34 per $100 property valuation. In
1990-91 under Senate Bill 1, school districts received an unadjusted basic allotment of $1910
per weighted student at a tax rate of $0.54 per $100 property valuation (tier one funding). For
the corresponding years, Senate Bill 1019 provided a guaranteed yield of $18.25 per weighted
student for each penny of tax effort above $0.34 and up to $0.70, and Senate Bill 1 guaranteed
$17.90 per weighted student at tax effort above $0.54 and up to $0.91 (tier two funding). By
changing the finance schemes, the legislature increased the 1990-91 scheduled amount of foundation program funding from approximately $2155 per student to $2570 per student. See
Adequacy Analysis ofSenate Bill 1, RESEARCH BRIEFS (Dept. of Research & Dev., Tex. Educ.
Agency), Autumn 1990, at 5; HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, supra note 35, at 7.

41. From the Capitol to the Schoolhouse: An Analysis of the 1990 Education Finance Act,
FISCAL NOTES (Tex. Comptroller's Office), July 1990, at 7. The "sin" taxes included increased

taxes on cigarettes and mixed drinks. The "rainy day" funds were appropriated from money
set aside in the Texas Economic Stabilization fund. Id.
42. HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, supra note 35, at 22.
43. Id. at 24. The State further argued that given time, the plan's self-adjusting equity
measures would balance a substantial majority of the existing disparities. Id. Under the plan
in 1990-91, the wealthiest district had $9.6 million in property wealth per student compared to
the poorest school district's $13,463 property wealth per student. STANDING EDUCATION
COMMITTEE OF THE 72ND LEGISLATURE, REPORT ON PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE LEGISLATION 1 (1991) [hereinafter STANDING EDUCATION COMMITTEE].

44. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. 1991) [hereinafter
Edgewood II]. In addition, the district court vacated the Texas Supreme Court's May 1, 1990
injunction due to concern over disrupting the public schools. Id.
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On January 22, 1991, the Texas Supreme Court took direct appeal of the
district court's decision 45 and agreed that the "State has made an unconstitutionally inefficient use of its resources."" The unanimous opinion noted
the "overall failure to restructure the system" as the present district boundaries allowed the wealthiest district "to draw funds from a tax base roughly
450 times greater... than the poorest district."'4 7 The court reiterated the
standards set forth in Edgewood I, emphasizing the failure of Senate Bill 1
"to equalize access to funds among all [school] districts."' 48 Attorneys for
the state and Texas legislators interpreted the new holding as a requirement
that virtually all districts and every child have "substantially equal access to
'49
similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort."
After two unanimous decisions, the Texas Supreme Court retreated into
dissension when Chief Justice Phillips and concurring justices added a
lengthy Opinion on Motion for Rehearing to the Edgewood II ruling.50
Plaintiff-intervenors, a second group of fifty-five low-wealth districts, 51 had
asked the supreme court, after its January 22, 1991, decision, to overrule
Love v. City of Dallas52 "to permit the [state-wide] recapture of local ad
valorem revenues for purposes of equalization. '5 3 Love held "that the Legislature cannot compel one district to construct buildings and levy taxesfor the
'54
education of nonresidentpupils."
The court, in its Edgewood II opinion, did not view the prior Love ruling
or the Texas Constitution as a "barrier to the general concept of tax base
consolidation. ' 55 The legislature could create "school districts along county
or other lines for the purpose of collecting tax revenue" to be redistributed to
districts within the new boundaries. 56 In other words, the court endorsed
the creation of school districts on some form of county-wide basis for the
limited purpose of tax base consolidation of property-poor and property-rich
districts. On motion for rehearing, however, the supreme court refused to
take the extra step of approving the state-wide recapture of locally raised
45. Id. "We therefore treat this proceeding as being in the nature of an original mandamus proceeding to direct the district court to reinstate our injunction." Id.
46. Id. at 496. Although the Texas Supreme Court vacated the part of the district court's

holding that vacated the higher court's injunction, the court stayed the effects of its reinstated
injunction until April 1, 1991. Id. at 498-99.

47. Id. at 496. Texas House Representative Paul Colbert labeled the decision a "SCUD
attack" on the legislature. In other words, a "Supreme Court Unanimous Decision." Wong,
supra note 36, at 16.
48. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 496, 498 (citing Edgewood I at 397-98).

49. Edgewood 1,777 S.W.2d at 397; see also Wong, supra note 36, at 16.
50. Edgewood 11, 804 S.W.2d at 499. On February 27, 1991 the court overruled the plain-

tiff-intervenors' motion for rehearing. Id.Concurring Justice Doggett accused the majority of

"shattering the good faith" of the court's previous unity by giving "an answer to a question the

movant never asked" in what amounted to an "advisory opinion." Id.at 501-03.
51.
52.
53.
54.
S.W.2d
55.
56.

HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, supra note 35, at 22.
40 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1931).
Edgewood I1,804 S.W.2d at 499.
Love, 40 S.W.2d at 27 (as quoted by the Texas Supreme Court in Edgewood 11,804
at 497) (emphasis added by Edgewood II opinion).
Edgewood I1,804 S.W.2d at 497.
Id. at 497, 498.
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revenue for purposes of equalization. 57
After approving county but not state-wide recapture, the court continued
its opinion by condoning the possibility of unequalized enrichment by individual school districts that composed the consolidated county taxing school
district.58 Justice Doggett's concurrence noted that the majority had converted the issue from "whether locally-raised taxes may be used to fund
other school districts... to whether locally-raised taxes may be used locally
to provide supplemental funds in the same district." 5 9 In short, the court
had qualified the efficiency mandate of Edgewood I: substantially equal access to school funding at similar tax efforts did not mandate that propertyrich school districts be prevented from raising enrichment funds that property-poor school districts could not raise.
D.

THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO EDGEWOOD II

The Texas Legislature answered Edgewood II's mandate to restructure
the public school finance system by passing Senate Bill 351.60 Subsequently,
a "clean-up" bill, House Bill 2885,61 clarified questions concerning the
County Education Districts (CEDs) created by the new plan. The new
scheme, which would have been fully operational by 1994-95,62 implements
a modified version of the state's previous three-tier funding system of basic
allotment, guaranteed yield, and local enrichment. 63 A simple example using the funding figures for the 1991-92 school year will help to illustrate the
mechanics of the plan. 64 At tier one, the newly created CEDs composed of
member school districts must tax at an effective rate of $0.72 per $100 of
taxable property to receive the State's unadjusted basic allotment of $2200
57. Id. at 499.
58. Id. at 500. "Once the Legislature provides an efficient system in compliance with

Article VII, Section 1, it may, so long as efficiency is maintained, authorize local school districts to supplement their educational resources if local property owners approve an additional
local property tax." Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 502 (Doggett, J., concurring). School district officials speculated that the Opinion on Motion for Rehearing constituted a political compromise thrown out to appease
wealthy, influential school districts. Interview with Robby Collins, Dallas I.S.D. Assistant
Superintendent, in Dallas, Texas (Oct. 10, 1991).
60. Act of Apr. 11, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 20, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381 (amended
May 27, 1991). See generally TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY, SCHOOL FINANCE UPDATE #6SENATE BILL 351 AS AMENDED BY HOUSE BILL 2885 (1991) (analyzing amendments and
additions to the Texas Education Code by 1991 legislation) [hereinafter UPDATE #6]; HOUSE
RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, DAILY FLOOR REPORT 24 (April 11, 1991) (summarizing the
second conference committee report on Senate Bill 351 by State Senator Carl Parker).
61. Act of May 27, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 391, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1475 (referred to
in the text as House Bill 2885). See also House Bill 2885-A "Clean-Up Bill, And Then Some,
NEWS & NOTES, (Equity Center, Austin, Tex.) May 1991, at 4 (noting the substantive changes
to Senate Bill 351 by House Bill 2885 as more administrative power given to the CEDs).
62. Theoretically, the equity of a funding system should be judged by full implementation,
or, in other words, the final year in which changes to the system phase in. Interview with
,Robby Collins, supra note 59.
63. Act of Apr. 11, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381 (amended
May 27, 1991).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 217-78 for a more detailed analysis of the Act's
finance scheme.
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per weighted 65 student. 66 At tier two, individual school districts can tax up
to $0.45 for enrichment of their instructional and facilities expenses with the
state guaranteeing $21.50 per weighted student for each penny of tax effort
above the $0.72 CED tax rate. 67 At tier three, the state provides no supplemental funds for locally-raised revenue at tax rates higher than the com-

bined tier one and tier two tax rates ($0.72 + $0.45), and school property
taxes are limited to a total tax rate of $1.50.68 Such a limit translates to a
maximum $0.33 tax rate for tier three unequalized local funding. 69 As to the
equity or fiscal neutrality70 of the system, tier one provides full equalization,7 ' tier two offers only partial equalization due to wealthy districts' ability to exceed the state guaranteed yield, 72 and tier three provides no
equalization at all.
Unlike Senate Bill 1, the 1991 school finance legislation introduces two
measures to enable low wealth school districts to generate revenue closer to
that of high wealth districts. 73 First, by creating the CEDs as a new taxing
65. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.151 (Vernon Supp. 1992). A weighted student is one
who requires special services from a school district under the state's special education programs. The state allotment for these students is determined by multiplying the district's basic
per student allotment times the statutory weight. For example, a homebound student's weight
factor is 5.0, thereby entitling the school district to a basic allotment multiplied by 5.0 for the
special education student. Id. If the basic allotment for that year was $2000, the district
would be allotted $10,000 (5.0 X $2000) for the student.
66. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 16.101, 16.252(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11,
1991, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws at 389, 399). Citations to the Texas Education Code have
been made to assist the reader in locating particular provisions. However, since the Edgewood
III court ruled the 1991 school finance legislation unconstitutional, Carrollton-Farmer's
Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 524 (Tex. 1992), the
education statutes will be amended again when the 1993 school finance legislation comes to
fruition. See infra text accompanying notes 124-29 for the scope and timing of the court's
holding.
67. Id. § 1 at 403, 404 (codified as an amendment to TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 16.302.303 (Vernon Supp. 1992)).
68. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 20.09(c) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of May 27, 1991, § 12,
1991 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1481). Certain exemptions apply to the combined $1.50 tax rate limit
for schools with present and future bond debt service. Id.
69. Id. The key to understanding the limit is to first realize that the $1.50 maximum
school property tax applies to levies by both the CED at tier one and the individual school
district at tiers two and three. The statute phrases the tax rate limit in terms of the total levy
that a school district can impose after the CED tax. For example, the 1990-91 school district
tax rate limit can be calculated by finding the difference between the CED's rate and the $1.50
maximum ($1.50 - 0.72 = $0.78). Next, to find the allowable tier three tax rate, subtract the
guaranteed yield tier two rate ($0.45) from the total school district rate allowed for the year
($0.78 - 0.45 = $0.33) Id.
70. Fiscal neutrality in public school finance means that "[t]he quality of a child's education should not be a function of wealth, other than wealth of a state as a whole." GUTHRIE &
REED, supra note 23, at 117 (quoting concept contributed by ARTHUR WISE, RICH SCHOOLS
POOR SCHOOLS (1970) and JOHN COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION

(1970)).
71. The CEDs are composed in such a way that their revenue will not exceed what the

state ensures to all CEDs for the basic allotment. See infra text accompanying notes 227-46
for a more detailed discussion.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 257-67 for a discussion of how the revenue limit

may help achieve greater tier two equalization.
73. See Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 497. The court noted that through some form of tax
base consolidation the school finance system could be made more efficient "by utilizing the

19921

TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM

authority on the tier one level, Senate Bill 351 effectively shifts portions of
locally-raised revenue from wealthy to poor districts as the CED pools the
collections of its assigned members and then equitably distributes it back to
them. 74 This recapture feature shifts a greater burden of the funding of
Texas public schools from the state to the local level as wealthy property
districts ease the state's obligation to fund property-poor districts. 75 Second,
House Bill 2885 establishes a procedure for calculating future caps 76 on the
amount of revenue that a wealthy school district can raise. 77 Not surprisingly, these two equalizing mechanisms 78 have turned property-rich districts
from defenders of the public school finance system in Texas to vocal
79
adversaries.
E.

EDGEWOOD III

The challenge to the Texas public school finance system created by Senate
Bill 351 and House Bill 2885 drew into question state constitutional provisions other than article VII, section 1,80 and cast the litigants in either new
or adjusted roles. 8 1 District Court Judge McCown separated the
resources in wealthy districts to the same extent that the remainder of the state's resources are
utilized." Id.
74. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.501 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991, § 1,
1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 405).
75. Tier one contributions by local districts in the 1990-91 biennium equaled $4.2 billion
or 32% of the funding cost. Legislature Passes AppropriationsBill in Final Hours, NEWS &
NOTES (Equity Center, Austin, Tex.) Aug. 1991, at 1. The estimate for the 1992-93 biennium
calls for $9.7 billion or 46% of tier one funding costs to come from local district revenues. Id.
See also Act of Aug. 13, 1991, 72d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 19, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 365, 776
(general appropriations bill for the 1992-93 biennium subtracts out approximately $9.7 billion
funded by the local districts in calculating the state appropriation for tier one of the school
foundation program). Despite the increased basic allotment and the higher state guaranteed
yield, the approximate $1.3 billion increase in state funding for the 1992-93 biennium is close
to the same amount that would have been appropriated under Senate Bill 1 if it had remained
in effect. School Finance: The Story Continues, FISCAL NOTES, (Tex. Comptroller's Office)
May 1991, at 1.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 260-67 for an interpretation of the revenue limit's
operation.
77. Act of Apr. 11, 1991, 72 Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 384
(amended May 27, 1991) (to be codified at TEX. EDUc. CODE ANN. § 16.009).
78. See GUTHRIE & REED, supra note 23, at 14.
79. See Terrence Stutz, Court Justices Question School Funding, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, November 20, 1991, at A26. The property-rich districts spearheaded the challenge to
the school finance package of Senate Bill 351. Id.
80. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (the recapture operation of the CEDs at tier one violates
court interpretation of § 3 by using taxes from one district to pay the expenses of another
district); TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3-b (the failure to obtain voter authorization for the taxes
levied by the new CEDs at tier one violates right of citizens to approve such property taxes);
TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-e (state-controlled CED redistribution of local revenue violates
prohibition on statewide property tax); TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § l(a) (the varying appraisal
practices for multi-county CEDs violates condition that taxes shall be equal and uniform as
accurately appraised counties within the multi-county CED shoulder the tax burden of "sister" CED counties appraised at low values). See infra notes 91-118 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the supreme court's Edgewood III holding on the first three constitutional
challenges listed above.
81. The original plaintiffs to the litigation are taking a back seat in support of the state
despite displeasure with the funding of facilities and dangers of tax revolt from the plan's
increased dependence on local property taxes. Various groups of property-rich districts are
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mushrooming legal issues into two parts, hearing arguments concerning the
constitutionally of the CEDs first and reserving for later judgment questions
of efficiency and suitable provision.8 2 In August 1991, Judge McCown
found no constitutional limits applicable to the legislature's creation of the
tax collecting CEDs, specifically rejecting the argument that they imposed a
83
state-wide property tax.
The district court's initial stamp of approval for the new finance scheme
opened the door for the Texas Supreme Court to tackle the politically
charged issue of CED constitutionality.8 4 On January 30, 1992, the supreme
court ruled that the Texas public school finance system enacted by the 1991
legislation was unconstitutional.8 5 The court sustained two out of three of
the appellant's challenges to the CEDs constitutionally, finding that "Senate
Bill 351 levies a state ad valorem tax in violation of article VIII, section l-e
and levies an ad valorem tax without an election in violation of article VII,
section 3 . .. ,"86 The court overruled the appellant's third contention that
the legislature did not have the power to create the CEDs due to constitutional limitations.8 7 The court did not consider, unlike in its decisions in
Edgewood I and Edgewood HI, whether Senate Bill 351 satisfied the efficiency
mandate88 since that issue was not raised by the appellants representing the
property-rich school districts.8 9 Instead, the court emphasized that the legisquestioning the constitutionality of the plan. In addition, the property-poor plaintiff-intervenors from Edgewood II have requested the court to fix "provisions on facilities, program revenue caps, and related tax limits," but have stopped short of asking for a wholesale rejection of
the plan. Plaintiff-IntervenorsLead Legal Challenge, NEWS & NOTES (Equity Center, Austin,
Tex.) June 1991, at 4 [hereinafter Plaintiff-Intervenors]; New Bill Doesn't Fix Some of the Old
Problems, NEWS & NOTES (Equity Center, Austin, Tex.) May 1991, at 2.
82. Edgewood Update: Just Wait 'Til the Spring, NEWS & NOTES (Equity Center, Austin,
Tex.) Sept. 1991, at 6.
83. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, No. 362516A, slip op. at 40 (Dist. Ct. of Travis
County, 250th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Aug. 7, 1991), rev'd sub nom. Carrollton-Farmers'
Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992) [hereinafter Edgewood Update]. The district court stated:
The county education districts created by S.B. 351 are a valid exercise of the
legislature's power to provide for the formation of school districts by general
law, and the direction contained within S.B. 351 to the trustees of those districts
to levy taxes sufficient to raise their local share for public schools is a valid
exercise of the legislature's authority to pass laws for the assessment and collection of taxes within school districts, and these taxes are not state ad valorem
taxes.
Id.
84. See Edgewood Update, supra note 82, at 6.
85. Carrollton-Farmer's Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826
S.W.2d 489, 524 (Tex. 1992) [hereinafter Edgewood III].
86. Id.The appellants consisted primarily of property-rich school districts challenging
the constitutionality of the CEDs. The supreme court consolidated five appeals from three
district courts to hear their "similar contentions." Id. at 489 n. 1. Three of the appeals were
initiated in the Travis County District Court presided over by Judge McCown. Id.
87. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 56; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 64(a).
Edgewood 11, 826 S.W.2d at 510-11.
88. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
89. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 493. The appellees included the State of Texas and
school districts that had challenged the Texas public school finance system in the earlier
Edgewood cases. Id. at 493 n.3. Although the appellee school districts supported the CEDs as
to their constitutionality in relation to the appellants' claims, some of these same school dis-
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lature's efforts to create an efficient school finance system to fulfill its constitutional duty did not give it license to violate other constitutional
provisions. 90
Article VIII, section l-e, of the Texas Constitution, a 1968 amendment,
was specifically drafted to repeal the use of state ad valorem school taxes. 9'
The key question was whether the CED tax amounted to a state or local tax.
The court concluded that it was a state tax because the CEDs were "mere
'93
puppets" 92 of the state, assigned "to levy a uniform tax statewide.
Two features of the CED operation convinced the court that the CED tax
amounted to an unconstitutional state ad valorem school tax rather than a
permissible local property tax. First, the state effectively set the CED tax
rate, leaving no room for local districts to vary the level of taxation. 94 The
court dismissed the argument that the CEDs had authority because they set
the actual tax rates (but not the effective tax rates) required to raise the state
calculated local fund assignment. 95 Rather than discretionary rate setting,
the CED adjustments to the statutory tax rate only required plugging num96
bers into a formula to adjust for such factors as variable collection rates.
Second, the court noted that a CED and its member school districts had no
choice but to participate in the program. 97 The court contrasted this with
previous "carrot-and-stick" plans in which the state offered incentives for
the school districts to tax at the local share rate but did not mandate such
action. 98 Based on the state-determined property tax rates and mandatory
CED participation, the court believed that CEDs were actually state agents
used to levy the prohibited ad valorem tax. 99
The supreme court gave no guidance as to "[h]ow far the State can go
toward encouraging a local taxing authority to levy an ad valorem tax" without it turning into a state tax.1°° Between uninhibited local discretion (a
local tax) and the kind of plan enacted by Senate Bill 351 (a state tax), the
court said there "lies a spectrum of other possibilities."' 0 1 Furthermore, the
tricts claimed in pending district court suits that Senate Bill 35 I's overall finance scheme failed
to achieve the constitutional standard of efficiency. Id.
90. Id. at 502.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 501.
93. Id. at 500.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 501. See infra notes 233-34 for a discussion of the variables that could cause a
CED to adjust the state's effective tax rate to raise their assigned local share.
96. Edgewood I1, 826 S.W.2d at 501.
97. Id. at 500. The manner in which the CEDs were composed assured that no CED (and
its component members) could afford not to participate in contributing their local shares. By
consolidating the tax bases, no CED on its own could raise more money than the state would
guarantee back to the CED as basic allotment funding. See infra notes 227-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the CED operation.
98. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 502.
99. Id. at 501. The court's conclusion that the CED tax amounted to a statewide property
tax posed an obstacle not easily overcome. The court emphasized this by noting that even
"voter approval" of the CED taxes would not by itself remove the constitutional roadblock.
Id. at 524 n.43.
100. Id. at 502-03.
101. Id. at 503.
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court stated that it would be "perhaps impossible" to determine "where
along this continuum such taxes become state taxes."' 1 2 As one prominent
commentator on Texas school finance expressed, this kind of court direction
would cause "[e]ven Nostradamus... [to] be out of his depth in predicting
10 3
the future of school finance reform in Texas."'
The supreme court also ruled that Senate Bill 351 violated the education
taxation provision in the Texas Constitution' 0 4 because the newly created
CEDs did not have voter approval for the taxes they levied. 10 5 The court
traced the history of the amendments to article VII, section three, and concluded that, between seemingly conflicting clauses, the one requiring voter
approval for the CED taxes applied to the particular facts surrounding the
creation of this new taxing entity. 06 The court reasoned that a contrary
interpretation would unnecessarily nullify constitutional clauses in violation
of principles of construction. 0 7 In further support, the court commented
that eight decades had passed since the adoption of the clause allegedly excusing the requirement of voter approval. '0 8 During that period, the legislature, in deference to the voter approval requirement, always proposed
constitutional amendments when it sought to alter the rules concerning local
ad valorem taxes. 09
The court denied the appellee's claim that article VII, section 3-b 10 negated the requirements of article VII, section three and enabled the legisla102. Id.
103. See Mark Yudof, School FinanceReform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 499, 505 (1991).

104. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
105. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 506. The court aptly described article VII, § 3 of the
Texas Constitution as a "constitutional wilderness," quoting and numbering only the relevant
clauses of the provision:
[1] the Legislature may also provide for the formation of school district[s] ...
[2] and the Legislature shall be authorized to pass laws for the assessment and
collection of taxes in all said districts and for the management and control of the
public school or schools of such districts, [3] and the Legislature may authorize
an additional ad valorem tax to be levied and collected within all school districts
...[4] provided that a majority of the qualified property tax paying voters of the
district, voting at an election to be held to that purpose, shall vote such tax ....
Id. at 503-04. See also id. at 505 (quoting 1909 amendment to TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3 for
further explanation of the disputed provision).
106. Id. at 504-06.
107. Id. at 506.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3-b. The constitutional provision provides in part:
No tax for the maintenance of public free schools voted in any independent
school district... shall be abrogated, canceled, or invalidated by change of any
kind in the boundaries thereof. After any change in boundaries, the governing
body of any such district, without the necessity of an additional election, shall
have the power to assess, levy and collect ad valorem taxes on all taxable property within the boundaries of the district as changed ... in the amount, at the
rate, and in the manner authorized in the district prior to the change .... In
those instances where the boundaries of any such independent school district are
changed by the annexation of, or consolidation with, one or more whole school
districts, the taxes to be levied for the purposes hereinabove authorized may be
in . . . the district having at the time of such change the greatest scholastic
population according to the latest scholastic census ....
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ture to levy the local property tax without voter approval.1 1 Instead, the
purpose of the provision was to dispense with the requirement of a tax authorizing election every time school district boundaries changed. 112 In cases
in which whole school districts' 13 were consolidated together or a part of a
school district was disannexed, the prior voter approval sufficed as authorization for the tax.' 4 If school districts were consolidated, the tax rate approved by the school district with the largest scholastic population
applied. " 5 If a school district broke off from a larger school district, it retained the rate that it had approved as part of the previous district. 16 The
court found that neither of these boundary change situations applied to the
creation of the CEDs because CEDs "stripped away" at least half of "districts' allotted tax authorization" to be "redeposited in a new state-controlled entity without voter participation."' 1 7 The court, responding to the
complaints of recapture critics, emphasized that CEDs fundamentally
changed school districts' property tax burden by requiring some school dis8
tricts to pay the costs of others without any voice in their operations."1
After finding the CED tax base consolidation unconstitutional, the
supreme court attempted to distinguish its Edgewood II endorsement of the
"general concept of tax base consolidation" ' 1 9 from the legislative plan that
the court now rejected.' 20 The court qualified its prior opinion by stating
that "[w]e did not say that tax base consolidation could not be unconstitutional; all we said was it could be constitutional."' 2' Despite the previous
assertion that school districts could be formed "along county or other lines
for the purpose of collecting tax revenue and distributing it to other school
districts within their boundaries,"'' 22 the court explained that implicit in the
text of the opinion (and explicit in the footnotes) was the need for voter
23
approval for such county taxing units.'
Id.; see also Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 548-50 (Doggett, J., dissenting) (quoting and analyzing the history and meaning of the constitutional amendment).
111. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 510.
112. Id. at 509.
113. The court viewed CED consolidation as partial rather than whole because the new
districts only assumed taxation authority and not other school district operations. Such a
functionally limited grant of authority did not correspond to the pre-authorization taxation
provisions of article VII, § 3-b dealing with geographic changes of whole districts. Id. at 50809.
114. Id. at 509.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 509-10.
119. Edgewood 11, 804 S.W.2d at 497.
120. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 511.
121. Id. at 512. The court's justification is commonly known as passing the buck to the
legislature. See id. at 546 (Doggett, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority's quoted rationalization as "doublespeak" designed to hide the court's responsibility for the misdeed of judicial
entrapment).
122. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 497-98.
123. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 512. The court cited footnote 14 from the Edgewood II
opinion as evidence that it considered voter approval a prerequisite to taxes levied by a county
unit created to consolidate the tax base. Id. at 512 (citing Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 497
n.14).

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

The court's holding invalidated the entire finance scheme enacted by Senate Bill 35 1, not just the CED provisions. 124 The court ruled, however, that
its decision should be given prospective effect, allowing the operation of the
unconstitutional CEDs through the 1991-92 and 1992-93 tax cycles.' 25 The
court believed that such a forward-looking decision was within a state's
rights 126 and did not violate due process principles of the United States Constitution by levying an illegal tax on citizens.' 27 Further, the court's application of the three-part federal test for civil prospectivity justified the holding
as necessary to avoid a "serious disruption in the education of Texas' children."' 28 As a last detail, the court stayed the effects of the district court's
original injunction in Edgewood I until June 1, 1993, ostensibly providing
129
the legislature with time required to enact a new plan.
If the majority's opinion did not suit a reader's taste, the supreme court
justices offered a lengthy smorgasbord of alternatives, with two concurring
and dissenting opinions and one dissent.' 30 Concurring Justice Gammage
succinctly explained that "[t]he fatal defect in Senate Bill 351 is its failure to
submit newly proposed taxing authorities to local voters as required by Article VII, sections 3 and 3-b of our State's Constitution."' 3' He criticized the
majority's "overwritten opinion" for its foray into federal law prospectivity
analysis and its thinly veiled, misplaced criticism of the legislature. 32 He
believed that the public school system's reliance on the presumed constitutionality of Senate Bill 351 justified an equitable, prospective application of a
decision unique to the Texas Constitution and its courts.' 33 Justice Gammage did not see, however, that extending the prospectivity beyond the
1991-92 taxing cycle served any equitable education interests but rather
' 34
seemed motivated more by "election-year political considerations."'
Fortunately, Justice Doggett provided a table of contents to accompany
his thirty-nine page dissent. '35 The dissent placed its strongest arguments in
sections II and V, first suggesting that the supreme court entrapped the legislature with its Edgewood II "advisory opinion" favoring tax base consolidation,' 36 and later insisting that the prospective ruling should be retroactive
for taxpayers subjected to the unconstitutional tax." 37 The dissent sharply
questioned the majority's backtracking on tax base consolidation, outlining
numerous court assurances in prior Edgewood litigation that a plan such as
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
524-35
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 515.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 517-18.
Id. at 521 n.38.
Id.at 521.
Id. at 523.
Edgewood II, 826 S.W.2d at 536-37 (Gammage, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at
(Cornyn, J., concurring and dissenting); id.at 537-76 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
Id. at 536 (Gammage, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 536-37.
Id.
Id.at 537.
Id. at 539 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
Id.at 540.
Id.at 557.
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Senate Bill 351 would not violate the state constitution. 138 As to the "prospective-plus" ruling, the dissent accused the majority of trying to have its
cake and eat it too. 139 First, the court held that the legislature enacted a
plan that stood outside the constitutional parameters of what the court had
"obviously contemplated."' 14 0 Then, the court said that despite the
clear
constitutional violation, the legislature acted in "good faith" and, therefore,
its disallowed plan should be treated leniently. 14 1 The dissent insisted that
the two positions did not mix, as prospective holdings apply to unexpected,
new rules of law, not to predictable, foreshadowed rulings.142 Consequently,
the dissent warned that the spectre of federal litigation via unconstitutional
tax challenges would further complicate the never-ending Edgewood

drama. 143
After Edgewood III, a state judicial scorecard for the Texas public school
finance battle would show one district court decision modified, 144 a second
district court decision partially vacated, 14 5 a third district court decision reversed and remanded, 146 a court of appeals decision reversed, 147 two Texas
Supreme Court decisions holding the school finance systems constitutional
violations of article VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution,' 48 one denial of
motion for rehearing, 149 and a third supreme court decision holding the
most recent school finance system a constitutional violation of article VIII,
section 1-e and article VII, section 3 of the Texas Constitution.' 50
The struggle to find a public school finance plan that will both satisfy the
court's constitutional concerns 15 ' and be politically acceptable to the Texas
Legislature has lasted nine years. In the midst of the fight is the constitutional duty of the legislature "to establish and make suitable provision for the
152
support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools."'
The next two sections will explain and analyze the operation of the 1990
138. Id. at 540-44.

139. See id. at 557.
140. Id. at 563.
141. Id. at 564.
142. Id. at 543, 563-64.
143. Id. at 569. The court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently shut the door on taxpayer federal due process challenges to the Edgewood III prospective holding on the CED
taxes in lower federal courts. Smith v. Travis County Educ. Dist., 968 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.
1992). The court held that the Tax Injunction Act 28 U.S.C. § 1341, barred the federal district
court from hearing challenges to a state tax system since Texas offered state "procedural avenue[s] . . . to pursue [the] federal due process claim." Id. at 456. The pending state court
actions showed that the state offered a potential remedy for the taxpayers' claims. Id.
144. See supra text and accompanying notes 28-33.
145. See supra text and accompanying notes 43-47.
146. See supra text and accompanying notes 81-90.
147. See supra text and accompanying notes 30-33.
148. See supra text and accompanying notes 32-35, 46-50.
149. See supra text and accompanying notes 51-60,
150. See supra text and accompanying notes 85-129.
151. See generally Stem, supra note 8, at 998-1006 (discussing the court's actions as an
unwarranted judicial intrusion into the legislative domain).
152. TEX. CO NST. art. VII, § 1 (emphasis added). The Dean of the University of Texas
School of Law, a distinguished commentator on school finance, suggests that the ideal constitutional system (100% efficient and suitable) is asking for perfection in an imperfect world.
See Yudof, supra note 103, at 501. He compares the cost of such a system to the cost of
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(Senate Bill 1) and 1991 (Senate Bill 351 and House Bill 2885) school finance
plans in relation to those twin, broad objectives. With the rhetoric flying,
the law in constant flux, and a 1993 finance scheme to come, the objective is
to step back and reflect on how the last two plans actually operated in order
15 3
to be informed rather than indoctrinated.
II. ACHIEVING THE MANDATE OF EFFICIENCY
Although this comment separates the issues of efficiency and suitability in
the next two sections, considerable overlap between the two concepts exists. 154 For example, recapture, discussed as a matter of efficiency, obviously
harms a school district's ability to provide enrichment, discussed as a matter
of suitability. Additionally, the creation of CEDs, categorized as an efficiency concern, also relates to the percentage share of funding assigned to
the state and local entities, categorized as a suitability concern. The separation has been made, however, for convenience of analysis, with the line of
demarcation as follows: Issues primarily concerned with fiscal neutrality are
questions of efficiency, whereas issues primarily concerned with the state
versus the local role in funding and the amount of revenue committed to
education are questions of suitability.
A.

WHAT EFFICIENCY MEANS TO TEXAS

The Texas Constitution directs the legislature to establish "an efficient system of public free schools" in order to preserve "the liberties and rights of
the people." 1 55 Texas Supreme Court Justice Mauzy addressed the meaning
of efficiency at length in Edgewood I, concluding that both the legislative and
judicial branches of the Texas government recognize "the implicit link that
the Texas Constitution establishes between efficiency and equality." 1 56 The
court also asserted that the constitutional mandate of efficiency, though less
than precise, provided the court with a sufficient standard to measure the
1 57
constitutionality of the legislature's school finance plans.
providing everyone with the highest quality diamond ring, noting that other priorities may be
pushed aside in the pursuit of the perfect but costly system. Id. at 501-02.
153. Concurring and dissenting Justice Gammage correctly identified the critical shortcoming of the court's and legislature's recent actions:
It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of their own
choice if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent
that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are
promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what
the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule

of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?
Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 536 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison)).
154. See supra text accompanying note I I for TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1, the education
clause establishing the key requirements of efficiency and suitability.
155. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; see generally Parker, supra note 8, at 881 (framer's did not
intend for the efficient school system to be a "state operated, state-mandated, centralized bureaucracy"); Watts & Rockwall, supra note 8, at 791-92 (framer's intended for an efficient
system to "equalize educational opportunity" among the rich and poor).
156. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 397.
157. Id. at 394.
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The judicial test for efficiency is whether the system chosen generates
"substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of
tax effort." 158 The court rejected legislative efforts to put more money into a
flawed system, concluding that legislative "band-aids" may temporarily
cover the funding disparities without curing the underlying cause. 1 59 That
underlying cause arises from the gross differences in local tax bases from
which individual school districts raise widely varying supplemental funds for
their instructional and facilities programs.160
State legislative policy adheres to the court's view by stating that education funding should be "substantially equal to those available to any similar
1 61
This policy of
student, notwithstanding varying local economic factors.
neutral education funding now expressly extends to revenue accumulated at
the local level. 162 The added wording, "considering all state and local tax
revenues," indicates the legislative intent to level out funding disparities arising from local ad valorem property taxes. 163 As a practical matter, the judicially crafted tests and state legislative policy amount to words without
substance until the legislature enacts a plan and the supreme court interprets
its compliance with the standards.
B.

OPTIONS FOR EQUALIZING FUNDING

Unequalized local funding of public education in Texas resulted from
what Judge Clark called the "irrational accident of school district lines." 164
In 1883 the Texas Constitution's school taxation provision 165 was amended
to allow for the legislative creation of school districts with the authority to
levy local property taxes. 166 At first, the local taxes levied were only a minor
supplement to the state's funding.1 67 Today, the local property taxes con158. Id. at 397.
159. Id.
160. The deficiencies the court complained about in Senate Bill I related to the local property tax. The plan allowed "districts to draw funds from a tax base roughly 450 times greater
per weighted pupil than the poorest district," failed to "attempt to equalize access to funds
among all districts," placed on "[miost property owners ... a heavier tax burden to provide a
less expensive education for students in their districts," and "insulate[d] concentrated areas of
property wealth from being taxed to support the public schools." Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at
496-97.
161. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.001(a) (Vernon 1991).
162. Texas statutory policy of fiscal neutrality states as follows:
The public school finance system of the State of Texas shall adhere to a standard
of neutrality which provides for substantially equal access to similar revenue per
student at similar tax effort, considering all state and local tax revenues of districts after acknowledging all legitimate student and district cost differences.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.001(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (emphasis added to the amending
portion). (Act of Apr. 11, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381).
163. See id.
164. School Daze: Finding the Right Equation, FISCAL NOTES, (Tex. Comptroller's Office)
March 1991, at 4-5 [hereinafter Texas Comptroller's Office] (concisely summarizing the history of school finance plans in Texas from 1875-1989).
165. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
166. See generally Watts & Rockwall, supra note 8, at 809-19 (discussing how the 1883
amendment was intended to equalize disparities between city and rural districts).
167. Id. at 813.
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tribute half of the funding required for Texas schools. 168 The heavy reliance
by the state on local property taxes along with the disparities in district
property wealth 169 necessitated that the state implement controls on local
tax rates and revenues to achieve efficiency. 170
In theory, the state has four options to equalize funding disparities arising
from local property taxes: (1) eliminate the use of the local property taxes in
favor of full state funding; (2) install revenue limits on local taxing so that
the state's resources can cover the less severe disparities; (3) recapture locally-raised revenues for equal distribution to the state's students; or (4)
combine options two and three. 171 The first option, full state funding, draws
criticism because the state has total discretion in setting the level of educational funding. 172 Without wealthier districts to pave the way for higher
educational funding, the state commitment threatens to be tied solely to the
state political budget process instead of the true cost of education. 173 In that
case, the state would no longer have to strive to meet the funding level of the
wealthy districts and per-pupil expenditures might be watered down to a
lower level that the state feels it can afford. 174 Hence, equalization through
full state funding may not lead to quality education for all, but rather to a
mediocre, state-controlled compromise for all. 175
The last three options involve the state capping the amount of local tax
effort to limit revenue and/or recapturing the funds of wealthy districts to be
distributed to the poor districts. 176 Caps protect a state from the prohibitive
cost of equalizing to the level of the wealthiest districts while recapture shifts
the burden of equalization from the state to local districts.' 77 State recap168. Texas Comptroller's Office, supra note 164, at 5. Estimated expenditures for the 198990 school year showed that $7 billion, or 46% derived from local taxes and $6 billion, or 39%,
derived from state expenditures. Id.

169.

TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, BENCH MARKS 1990-91 SCHOOL DISTRICT BUDGETS IN

TEXAS 21 (1991) [hereinafter TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE]. In 1990-91, Edcouch Elsa I.S.D.

could raise $21 per student at a tax rate of $1.00 per $100 of taxable district property. At the
same rate, Lauraless I.S.D. could raise $10,977 per student. Id.
170. See ROE L. JOHNS ET AL., THE ECONOMICS & FINANCING OF EDUCATION 177 (4th

ed. 1983).
171. See id. at 238.
172. See id. at 251.
173. Interview with Dr. Hoyt Watson, Professor of Educational Administration at North
Texas State University, in Dallas, Tex. (Oct. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Interview with Dr. Hoyt
Watson]. Property-rich districts are called "lighthouse districts" because they tend to set the
course for higher levels of expenditures. Id.
174. Attorneys for Texas in Edgewood II noted that the state could not afford to equalize to
the level of the wealthiest districts since the expense would be "four times the annual cost of
operating the entire state government." Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 495-96; see also POLICY
ANALYSIS FOR CALIFORNIA EDUCATION (PACE), 1990 CONDITIONS OF EDUCATION IN CALIFORNIA 4-5 (Apr. 1991) [hereinafter PACE] (discussing the dominant role that state politics
play in California's educational funding since the passage of Proposition 13 restricting local

property taxes); Lawrence Picus, Cadillacs or Chevrolets.: Effects of State Control on School
Finance in California, 17 J. EDUC. FIN. 33, 59 (concluding that California's state control of
educational revenue "equalizes expenditure disparities and has eliminate[d] differences in tax
effort" at the cost of creating "more Chevrolets and fewer Cadillacs among the state's
schools").
175. See KOZOL, supra note 1, at 208.
176. See JOHNS ET AL., supra note 170, at 177.
177. Mark G. Yudof, School FinanceReform: Don't Worry, Be Happy, 10 REv. LITIG 585,
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ture can be achieved either directly, through state-controlled property taxation and distribution, or indirectly, by "reorganiz[ing] the school districts of
the state in such a way as to give each the same or approximately the same
1 78
resources per pupil."
The manner in which one characterizes recapture separates those who
favor the equalization method from those who do not. Proponents view it as
79
shifting a surplus from one area to subsidize shortfalls in other areas.1
Critics dismiss the popular "Robin Hood" analogy as too kind, preferring to
emphasize the sacrifice of educational excellence by those districts losing

money.180 The two contrasting perspectives emphasize the dilemma of
drafting and funding a plan that manages to create an efficient public school
finance system as well as an educationally sound one.
1: THE 1990 PLAN
Senate Bill 1 arose from the Supreme Court of Texas' mandate to equalize
districts' level of tax effort to generate similar amounts of revenue.' 8' The
Act of June 6, 1990 incorporated three measures to achieve the goal: (1)
C.

SENATE BILL

increases in the amount of revenue guaranteed by the state in its two-tier
foundation program;18 2 (2) provisions for studies to monitor emerging inequities so policymakers could adjust funding accordingly; 183 and (3) a state
84
policy approximating neutral funding.'

1.

The Multi-Tiered FinanceSystem

Texas' two-tier foundation program, 185 originally devised in Senate Bill
1019,186 consists of a basic allotment per pupil and a limited guaranteed
590 (1991). "Perhaps the most important point to understand about recapture is that it pits

statewide elected officials against local officials. If school finance reform is achieved through a
guaranteed-yield system - dependent on new state funds - then legislators will need to vote for
additional taxes and take the accompanying political heat." Id.
178. JOHNS ET AL., supra note 170, at 257.
179. See GUTHRIE & REED, supra note 23, at 115.
180. Compare Gregory Curtis, Busing Money, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar. 1991, at 5 (equating
court's emphasis on tax-base consolidation with a holding that it is "unconstitutional to be
best") with KOZOL, supra note 1, at 223 (discounting such attorney doublespeak as "redistribution" and the "liberty" of "local control," preferring instead to cast the finance battle as a class
struggle in which the property-poor school districts seek a fair share of the available education
funds).
181. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397.
182. Act of June 6, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws I (amended 1991
by Act of Apr. 11, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 389, 403).
183. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.202(a)(1) (Vernon 1991).
184. Act of June 6, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (amended
1991).
185. Texas has a three-tier finance system but a two-tier state foundation program. The
foundation program relates to what the state guarantees to local districts for financing their
schools and constitutes two of the three tiers in the finance system. The third tier consists
totally of local funding without state aid. See Texas Comptrollers' Office, supra note 164, at 1.
186. Act of May 29, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 816, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 3732 (amended
1990, 1991). The earlier act set the foundation program figures for the 1989-90 school year: (1)
basic allotment of $1477 per weighted student with a local fund assignment tax rate of $0.34;
and (2) guaranteed yield of $18.25 per weighted student for each penny of tax effort above
$0.34 and up to $0.70. TEXAS RESEARCH AGENCY, RESEARCH BRIEFS 6 (Summer 1990).
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yield on a tax effort that exceeds the tax rate required to receive the basic
allotment. 18 7 The basic allotment'8 " under the first tier provides the minimum financing sufficient for "a basic program of education that meets accreditation and other legal standards."' 1 9 The guaranteed yield gives school
districts "the opportunity to supplement the basic program at a level of its
own choice."' 190

Tier one's basic allotment in Senate Bill 1 was $1910 per student for the
1990-91 school year, rising to $2128 per student by full implementation in
1992-95.191 For a school district to receive its per pupil share of the allotment, the state required school districts to tax at a uniform rate. 192 The
revenue that each district generated at the required rate, excluding local revenues in excess of the allotment, became the local district's share of the cost
of the state's foundation program. 193 Senate Bill 1 set the 1990-91 rate at
$0.54 per $100 of taxable property, with the rate rising to $0.70 at full implementation in 1994-95.194 Theoretically, by raising the minimum local tax
rate for tier one participation, the finance plan becomes more equitable as
wealthier districts end up covering the cost of their basic allotment so that
the state can concentrate its resources on poorer districts. 195
A simple example using figures from the unconstitutional finance system
of Senate Bill 1 will help to illustrate the relationship between each district's
local share and the state basic allotment. District Poor (P) has $100,000 of
taxable property per weighted student and District Rich (R) has $400,000 of
taxable property per weighted student. The year is 1994-95, making the tax
rate $0.70 per $100 of taxable property and the unadjusted basic allotment
$2128 per weighted student. District P raises $700 per weighted student
187. Act of June 6, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S:, ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (amended
1991).
188. The basic allotment figure does not match the actual basic allotment given to school

districts because a system of weights and adjustments accounts for variables peculiar to each
district's make-up that raise the cost of education. Act of Apr. 11, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch.
20, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 390 (amended May 27, 1991) (small district adjustment and
special education weights codified as an amendment to TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 16.103,
16.151 (Vernon Supp. 1992)).
189. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.002(b) (Vernon 1991).

190. Id. § 16.301.
191. Act of June 6, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (amended
1991). The foundation school fund budget committee possessed the authority to set a different
per-pupil amount in a later year if the studies of the statutory funding elements supported a
change. Id.
192. Id. The apparent redundancy in the text with school district is intentional because
county education districts have taken over the tier one taxing role that school districts had
under Senate Bill 1. See infra text accompanying notes 227-30.
193. Act of June 6, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (amended
1991). Although a district had to tax at a required rate to be eligible for aid from the foundation school program, the finance system did not require districts to participate in the program.
For example, in 1990-91 Glen Rose I.S.D. (a nuclear power plant located there favorably
skews the property values) only taxed at a rate of $0.22 but was able to provide each of its

weighted students $10,660 without state aid.

TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE,

supra note 169, at

A35.
194. Act of June 6, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (amended
1991).
195. HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, supra note 35, at 10.
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($100,000 X $0.70 / $100) and District R raises $2800 per weighted student
($400,000 X $0.70 / $100). Per weighted student, district P's local share is
$700 and District R's is limited to $2128 because a district's local share does
not exceed the basic allotment figure. The state will supplement District P's
share $1428 to raise its revenue to the state guaranteed basic allotment ($700
local share + $1428 state supplement = $2128 basic allotment). District R
keeps its $2800, retaining the $672 that exceeds the amount of the state basic
allotment. Hence, even at tier one, funding disparities arise when propertyrich districts can surpass the basic allotment at the tier one or local share tax
rate.
Tier two flexibly rewards tax effort by the state guaranteeing a set amount
of funds per weighted student for each penny of tax effort above the tier
one's local share rate and not in excess of the guaranteed yield enrichment
tax limit. 196 The tax rate limit on the guaranteed yield is set by the current
statute in effect. 197 Senate Bill 1 in 1994-95 would have guaranteed $26.05
per weighted student for each penny of tax effort that exceeded the $0.70
basic allotment rate up to $1.18, making the limit on the tier two enrichment
tax equivalent to $0.48.198 A district that can raise $26.05 or more per
weighted student with each penny of tax effort receives nothing from the
state but is able to keep the excess.1 99
Using the earlier figures from Districts P and R, the state will only need to
help District P. District R can raise $40 per weighted student ($400,000 X
$0.01 / $100) so the state will let District R cover the $26.05 guaranteed
amount. District P can raise only $10 per weighted student ($100,000 X
$0.01 / $100) so that the state guarantees the difference of $16.05 ($26.05 $10.00) to help equalize funding. If both Districts R and P choose to levy a
$1.00 local property tax, $0.30 above the local share rate, at tier two they
would respectively raise $1200 (30 X $40) and $781.50 (30 X $26.05) per
weighted student. The total two-tier funding for District R would then be
$4000 per weighted student ($2800 + $1200), whereas it would only be
$2909.50 ($2128 + $781.50) for District p.200
Finally, under Senate Bill 1, local tax rates that exceeded the $1.18 maximum foundation program tax rate could be used to generate revenue described as unequalized local enrichment. 20 1 This third tier of financing was
limited by a $1.50 effective tax rate ceiling on maintenance and operation
196. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.302 (Vernon 1991).

197. Id. § 16.303.
198. Act of June 6, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (amended
1991). Senate Bill 1 Requires Equity Monitoring, RESEARCH BRIEF (Tex. Educ. Agency) Sum-

mer 1990, at 6 [hereinafter Equity Monitoring].
199. Act of June 6, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (amended
1991). Edgewood v. Kirby Update, RESEARCH BRIEFS, (Tex. Educ. Agency) Autumn 1990, at

2 [hereinafter Tex. Educ. Agency].
200. In Region 10, one of twenty educational subdivisions servicing assigned counties, four
districts had taxable property wealth higher than $400,000 per weighted student and twentyeight had taxable property wealth lower than $100,000 per weighted student. TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, supra note 169, at A31, A33.
201. Tex. Educ. Agency, supra note 199, at 2.
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school property taxes. 20 2 Hence, districts could choose to tax at $0.32 above
the foundation program combined rates of $1.18. This option particularly
disturbed the Texas Supreme Court in Edgewood II because at full implementation in 1994-95 a property-poor school district could tax at $1.50 and
generate approximately $4600 per student, whereas a property-rich school
20 3
district could generate approximately $9200 per student at the same rate.
2. Legislative Policy, Equity Monitoring, and Efficiency
Senate Bill 1 attempted to deal with the potential inequities of the system
by giving the Foundation School Fund Budget Committee (FSFBC) the authority to adjust the two-tier funding levels after reviewing financial studies. 2° 4 State legislative boards in cooperation with the Texas Education
Agency were charged with compiling information each biennium on the "fiscal neutrality of the system. '20 5 The legislative boards were limited to recommending an amount for future years of the program that "may not be less
than ninety-five percent nor more than one hundred percent of the ninety-

fifth percentile of state and local revenue per pupil."'20 6 This limit on state
funding could be changed by the FSFBC, however, if the members felt that
20 8
neutral funding policies 20 7 were not satisfied.
The state argued in Edgewood II that this "self-adjusting" equity mechanism could give wealthy districts the freedom to set desired levels of funding
and, at the same time, provide the state with a barometer for setting an equitable and appropriate amount of state support. 20 9 In practice, though, increased state funding, state equity monitoring, and 95 percent student
equality failed to satisfy the court's efficiency mandate of equal levels of tax
202. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 20.04(d) (Vernon 1991).
203. Tex. Educ. Agency, supra note 199, at 3. The amounts cited include the appropriate
weights and adjustments to the state's basic allotment. Id.
204. The FSFBC is composed of the governor, the lieutenant governor, and the comptroller of public accounts. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.256(a) (Vernon 1991).
205. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.202(a)(1) (Vernon 1991).
206. Act of June 6, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (amended 1991
by Act of Apr. 11, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 396-97). Senate
Bill l's confusing limit on the amount recommended by the boards requires three steps to
solve. First, the districts are ranked by their previous year's state and local revenue totals.
Second, starting with the lowest ranked revenue districts, the state accumulates the populations of the districts until the figure crosses the 95% line of the total number of students
statewide. The district that breaks the line becomes the 95th percentile district. Finally, the
amount of state and local revenue of the 95th percentile district sets the range for guaranteed
state funding, with the state having the choice to fund anywhere from 95% to 100% of that
total. For example, if the 95th percentile district has revenue equalling $5000 per weighted
student, the legislative board's recommended amount for program funding would range from
$4750 (95% of $5000) to $5000 per weighted student (100% of $5000). HOUSE RESEARCH
ORGANIZATION, supra note 35, at 17-18.
207. Senate Bill I set forth the following policy pledge: "the yield of state and local educational program revenue per pupil per cent of effective tax effort shall not be statistically significantly related to local taxable property wealth per student in which 95 percent of students
attend school." Act of June 6, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws I
(amended 1991).
208. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.256(c) (Vernon 1991).
209. See Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 496; see also Equity Monitoring,supra note 198, at 15.
(discussing the structure and process of reviewing equalized funding elements).
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effort to raise substantially similar amounts of revenue. 210 In 1990-91, taxes

on an $80,000 homestead varied from less than $300 for fifteen school districts to more than $1000 for fifty-nine school districts. 2 1' Further, the one
hundred poorest school districts at a tax rate close to $1.00 raised a total
adjusted revenue of $4063 per weighted student, whereas the one hundred
richest school districts at a rate close to $0.75 raised $8212 per weighted
student. 2 12 Consequently, the court endorsed tax base consolidation as an
2 13
efficient remedy to the funding disparities.
Only conjecture remains as to whether the changes of Senate Bill 1 would
have sparked a steady movement toward greater equity or just temporarily
adjusted the disparities. The supreme court's ruling shows distrust for the
self-adjusting process assigned to the FSFBC for ultimate funding decisions. 2 14 Instead of subjecting the efficiency of the public school finance system to the decisions of currently elected legislators and executives, the court
supports a clearly defined and more permanent statutory fulfillment of the
constitutional mandate. 2 15 The efficiency mandate did not ask policymakers
to pledge to work towards equalization under a polished version of the old
finance system. Rather, the legislature was duty bound to "restructure the
system" so that equalized funding would truly be a matter of constitutional
216
right, not legislative discretion.
D.

SENATE BILL

351

AND HOUSE BILL

2885: THE 1991 PLAN

After the Texas Supreme Court found the public school finance system
under Senate Bill 1 to be unconstitutional, the Texas legislature returned to
the drawing board and produced Senate Bill 351.217 Shortly thereafter, in
House Bill 2885, the legislature amended portions of Senate Bill 351 by filling unintended gaps and clarifying uncertain terms. 2 18 The new legislation
distinguishes itself from previous funding efforts by the creation of County
210. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 399; Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 496.
211. TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, supra note 169, at 19.
212. Texas Comptroller's Office, supra note 164, at 5.
213. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 497. The court also mentioned that consolidation of
whole school districts, including school operations rather than just taxation authority, could be

a constitutional alternative. Id. The court's one sentence treatment of the option indicated
that the prospect of such a choice would be slim. One commentator has suggested that Sadam
Hussein would be "more popular in Kuwait than school district consolidation is in Texas."
Yudof, supra note 177, at 589.
214. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 500.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 497.
217. Act of Apr. 11, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 20, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381 (amended
May 27, 1991). After the Edgewood III prospective holding, the unconstitutional 1991 finance
scheme of Senate Bill 351 and House Bill 2885 is a lame-duck plan that must be replaced by
the legislature no later than June 1, 1993. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 522-23. See supra
notes 85-129 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scheme's constitutional
shortcomings.
218. Act of May 27, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 391, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1475; see generally UPDATE #6, supra note 60 (concise analysis by the state's education agency of the 1991
Acts).
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for the purpose of tax base consolidation. 220

22 1
In addition, the new law introduces revenue limits.

1. CEDs - The Mechanics of Recapture
The legislature had two major obstacles to the transfer of local property
tax revenue from one school district to another. First, the Texas Constitution, article VIII, section l-e proclaimed that "[n]o State ad valorem taxes
shall be levied upon any property within this State."' 222 Hence, unless a constitutional amendment passes, Texas cannot collect property taxes at the
state level and then distribute them on an equal basis to the students of the
22 3
state. Second, an old Texas Supreme Court ruling, Love v. City of Dallas,
held that "districts shall be organized and taxes levied for the education of
scholastics within the districts" and "that the legislature cannot compel one
district to construct buildings and levy taxes for the education of nonresident

pupils."' 224 The court, however, in Edgewood II lessened the severity of this

obstacle by liberally construing the ability of the legislature to create dis225
tricts for the sole purpose of taxation.
As a result of the holding, the legislature had a blueprint for drafting a
system of recapture in Texas. First, local taxing districts would need to be
created and composed in such a way that tax base disparities could no longer
be so great as to hinder the state's equalization efforts through the foundation program. 226 And, second, a method would need to be developed for
transferring funds within each new taxing district from the wealthier to the
poorer members.
219. The legislature based its authority to create the CEDs for taxation purposes on TEX.
CONST. art. VII, § 3:
and the Legislature may also provide for the formation of school district by
general laws . . . and the Legislature shall be authorized to pass laws for the
assessment and collection of taxes in all said districts ... and the Legislature
may authorize an additional ad valorem tax to be levied and collected within all
schools heretofore formed or hereafter formed ....
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3. See generally 2 GEORGE BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 514-19 (describing history and explaining meaning of education's taxation provision, noting the section exemplifies
"how not to write a constitution").
220. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 16.501, 20.941-.948 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11,

1991, §§ 1, 2, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 405-08).
221. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.009 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of May 27, 1991, § 2,
1991 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1475).
222. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-e. See Senate Bill 351, which left the door open for statewide recapture by providing for the abolition of CEDs "if the voters adopt a constitutional
amendment authorizing the redistribution among other school districts of taxes levied by a
school district." Act of Apr. 11, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 2, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381,
408 (to be codified at TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 20.948).
223. 40 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex. 1931).
224. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 497 (quoting Love, 40 S.W.2d at 27).
225. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 497. The court noted that the "consolidation of school
districts" could be "an avenue toward greater efficiency in our school finance system." Id.
The logistical and political problems of consolidating the school districts themselves probably
motivated the court less than serious treatment of the alternative.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 185-203 for a discussion of how the foundation
program operated under prior law.
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a. Creation and Composition
Senate Bill 351 creates 188 CEDs for the limited purpose of levying and
collecting local property taxes sufficient to raise the CED's share of the
state's foundation program under tier one (basic allotment). 227 The CEDs
do not directly interfere with a local school district's tax efforts at tier two
(guaranteed yield) of the foundation program. 228 The plan assigns the 1047
school districts in Texas to either a CED that corresponds to the boundaries
of Texas' 254 state counties or to a multi-county statutory CED. 229 NinetyCEDs, leaving 157 CEDs
seven counties have been combined into thirty-one
230
that match the state county boundaries.

The Act controls the ability of a CED and its component school districts
to raise local property tax revenue by arranging the boundaries "to ensure
that no district [CED] has a taxable value of property in excess of $280,000
per weighted student... or a value set by the foundation school fund committee.

' 23 1

The reason underlying the selection of the $280,000 figure be-

comes clear by looking at the tier one CED tax, and the basic allotment for
the full implementation school year, 1994-95.232 The state basic allotment of
$2,800 per weighted student is conditioned on the CED contributing a local
fund assignment by taxing at an effective rate233 of $1.00 per $100 of taxable
property. 234 Assuming a CED has the maximum $280,000 property wealth,
the $1.00 effective tax rate would generate the $2,800 basic allotment without a surplus. Hence, the scheme effectively prevents the property wealth of
227. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 20.941-.942 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991,
§ 2, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 406-07). See supra text accompanying notes 188-95 for an
example of tier one funding under prior law.
228. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 16.301-.303 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991,
§ 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 403-04). See supra text accompanying notes 194-98 for a discussion of tier two funding under prior law.
229. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 20.941 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991, § 2,
1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 406-07).
230. See UPDATE #6, supra note 60, at 35.
231. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 20.941(c) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991, § 2,
1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 407). Using 1990 figures, individual CED property wealth per
weighted student ranged from a high of $279,610 to a low of $43,750 with the state average
property tax base equaling $187,848. TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, supra note 169, at 16;
STANDING EDUCATION COMMITTEE,

supra note 43, at 2.

232. Interview with Dr. Hoyt Watson, supra note 173.
233. The actual tax rate set by a CED to raise its local fund assignment does not match the
effective tax rate due to variances in collection rates, differences between state and county
appraisals, changes in property values that develop after the time of state appraisal and before
the CED rate setting, and unaccounted for residence and homestead exemptions recently enacted. CED Tax Rates Vary Widely for a Reason, EQUITY CENTER NEWS & NOTES, Aug.
was set at $0.72, but CEDs set actual rates ranging
1991, at 4. In 1991, the effective tax rat.;
from a low of $0.52 to a high of $0.99 in order to raise their local fund assignment. TEXAS
COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE, SURVEY OF COUNTY EDUCATION DISTRICTS - ATTACHMENT C 21,
29 (Oct. 1991). In addition, joining school districts into one CED has an equalizing effect on
the above tax setting factors. Districts that could have lower actual tax rates by themselves
end up shouldering part of the tax burden of member districts that would have required higher
actual tax rates. See Property Tax Legislation of the 72nd Legislature, TEXAS RESEARCH
LEAGUE ANALYSIS, June 1991, at 1-3 [hereinafter Property Tax Legislation].
234. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 16.101, 16.252 (Vernon Supp. 1992). The State Property
Tax Board, using prior tax year values, determines the value of taxable property upon which
the local fund assignment is calculated. (d.§ 11.86.
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individual school districts from causing any unequalized funding at the tier
235
one level.

b. Distribution of Funds Within the CED
The CEDs provide for the local share of the state's foundation program by
levying an effective tax rate of "$0.72 for the 1991-92 school year, $0.82 for
the 1992-93 school year, $0.92 for the 1993-94 school year, and $1.00 for
each school year thereafter.1 236 The CED then distributes the collected
funds "on the basis of the component districts' share of the taxable value of
property. ' 237 However, "no component district 2 38 shall receive funds in excess of the cost of tier one less the distribution of the available school
fund."'239 The "excess" becomes subject to recapture by the CED and then
distribution to the other, less wealthy CED members. 24° Technically, the
"Robin Hood" part of the plan occurs only at the county level without involvement by the state.
The following example illustrates a simplified view of how CED taxation
and fund distribution would have operated at full implementation if the plan
had been ruled constitutional. 24 1 The year is 1994-95 and District Indigent
(I), District Poor (P), and District Wealthy (W) each educate 1000 weighted
students. The state creates a CED composed of the three districts. Districts
I, P, and W have property wealth per student equaling $125,000, $125,000,
and $500,000, respectively. At the 1994-95 $1.00 CED effective tax rate per
$100 of taxable property, 242 I raises $1250 per student, P raises $1250 per
student, and W raises $5000 per student. Multiplied by the 1000 weighted
students in each district, I, P, and W generate revenue totaling $1.25 million,
$1.25 million, and $5 million, respectively.
235. See supra text following note 196 and preceding note 194 for an example of how
wealthy districts could generate tier one surpluses under prior law.
236. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.252(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
237. Id. § 16.501(b).
238. For 1990-91 budget-balanced districts (those that could raise foundation program
funding strictly from local revenue and the available school fund), certain exceptions would
have applied until September 1,1994, allowing the CED to distribute funds that exceed a
school district's proportional CED share if needed to maintain that district's 1990-91 funding
level. Id. § 16.501(c).
239. Id. § 16.501(b). The available school fund is a per capita constitutional distribution
given to Texas students regardless of their district's wealth. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 5(a).
Currently, this equals about $300 per student. TEXAS COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE, supra note
164, at 6. Subtracting the available school fund from the cost of a district's tier one foundation
program ensures that it cannot be used as a surplus, thus correcting one prior contributor to
unequalized funding.
240. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.501 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
241. The example does not correspond to any possible CED funding scenario. Its primary
purpose is to walk through the obtuse statutory language that describes a process whereby
each school district in a CED taxes at the same level to get its basic allotment and no more.
Those districts that cannot raise their basic allotment are helped either by a wealthy district's
surplus or, if there is none, state aid. For a realistic look at school finance, see generally,
UPDATE #6 supra note 60, at 82-87 (containing a six-page "Worksheet For Estimating Foundation School Program Aid" that takes into account such variables as a cost of education
index, small district adjustment, and special education weights).
242. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.252 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991, § 1,
1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 400).
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The unadjusted 24 3 basic allotment for the year equals $2800 per weighted
student. 2 " The available school fund for that year turns out to be $300.245
The recapture formula dictates that an individual school district's proportional distribution cannot exceed their cost of tier one less the available
school fund ($2800 - $300 = $2500).24 6 For W, its $5000 proportional per
student share of the taxable property revenue exceeds its allowable distribution by $2500. I's and P's $1250 proportional per student share of the taxable property revenue falls below the allowable distribution of $2500.
Consequently, the CED can distribute W's $2500 excess to I and P, raising
them up to the basic allotment level guaranteed by the state. In terms of
total CED revenue, $2.5 million of W's revenue is shared with I and P, making them all equally funded at tier one and lessening the state's burden of
equalization costs.
2.

Tiers Two and Three: Guaranteed Yield and Unequalized Local
Enrichment

Since CEDs operate only at the tier one level, individual school districts
retain limited control over taxation for guaranteed yield 247 and unequalized
enrichment. 248 Tier two, or guaranteed yield, 249 maintains its purpose "to
provide each school district with the opportunity to supplement the basic
program at a level of its own choice and with access to additionalfunds for
facilities.'' 250 For up to $0.45 above the CED actual tax rate, school districts
can raise funds for enrichment and facilities. 25 ' The state guarantees that
243. For 1994-95, the average adjusted basic allotment for school districts is estimated to
be $3167 or $367 above the unadjusted basic allotment. Unlike the example, districts' basic
allotments will be different depending on their cost variables. Edgewood Lawsuit: Curtain
Going Up on Act 4, NEWS & NOTES, (Equity Center, Austin, Tex.) May 1991, at 1 [hereinafter
Edgewood Lawsuit].
244. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16. 101 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991, § l,
1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 389).
245. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 5(a).
246. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.501(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991, § I
at 405).
247. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.302(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991, § 1
at 403-04).
248. Act of Apr. 11, 1991, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 1, § 3, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 408,
amended by Act of May 27, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 391, § 12, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1475,
1481 (to be codified at TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 20.09(a)).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 196-200 for a discussion of tier two operation
under prior law.
250. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.301 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991 § 1,
1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 403) (emphasis added to amending portion). The issue of facilities
funding, as distinguished from maintenance and operations funding for a district's instructional program, raises important questions of efficiency beyond the scope of this comment.
The essential debate centers around whether such funding should be placed in equalized tier
one, partially equalized tier two, or some special tier of its own. Why FacilitiesAllotments in
Tier 1?, NEWS & NOTES, (Equity Center, Austin, Tex.) Sept. 1991, at 3 (arguing that an
efficient finance system requires inclusion of facilities funding in tier one); PlaintiffIntervenor's,
supra note 81, at 5 (added statutory wording for facilities in tier two only codifies what had
been past practice).
251. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.303) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991, § 1,
1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 404).
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each penny of local tax effort will provide $21.50 per weighted student rising
to $28.00 per weighted student by the 1994-95 school year. 252 Unlike tier
one, wealthy district's revenue that exceeds the state guaranteed funding
253
does not get recaptured.
At tier three, where the state provides no funding, the school districts can
only tax at a rate that does not exceed $1.50 including the CED effective tax
rate and the guaranteed yield tax rate. 254 Because the CED effective tax rate

rises from $0.72 in 1991-92 to $1.00 in 1994-95 and the tier two tax rate
remains constant at $0.45, the limit on the local enrichment tax correspondingly falls from $0.33 in the first year to

3.

$0.05255

by the last year. 256

The Revenue Limit

In addition to limiting tax rates, Senate Bill 351 caps the amount of revenue that can be generated by school districts in an attempt to control funding disparities that could arise above the CED level.2 57 Two caveats should

precede discussion of this new law. First, school finance experts note that
the ambiguous drafting makes it unclear how the cap operates. 258 Second,
the Commissioner of Education's role in determining districts' limits each
year raises questions of legitimacy that cannot be answered until the system
259
operates for a couple of years.
The new finance plan defines the revenue limit as "an amount equal to 110
percent of the amount of state and local funds guaranteed under the Foundation School Program... at a total tax rate of $0.25 per $100 of taxable value
of property as calculated for the 1994-95 school year." 26° The revenue limit
excludes funds generated for debt service of facilities, thus allowing districts
2 61
to exceed the revenue limit when funds are earmarked for that purpose.
A probable application for the 1994-95 school year would be as follows: (1)
the Commissioner of Education determines that the average district requires
an adjusted basic allotment of $3167 per weighted student ($2800 + $367
252. Id. § 16.302(a).
253. CED distribution provisions are only "[flor tier one." Id. § 16.501(b).
254. Id. § 20.09(a) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991, § 3, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 408).
255. As to the court's efficiency mandate, Senate Bill 351's final $0.05 limit on unequalized
local enrichment compares favorably with Senate Bill l's $0.32 limit. See supra text accompanying notes 201-03.
256. The following examples illustrate how to determine the year's tier three tax rate limit:
(1) 1991-92: $1.50 - ($0.72 + 0.45) = $0.33; (2) 1994-95: $1.50 - ($1.00 + 0.45) = $0.05.

See id.

257. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.009 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991, § 1,
1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 384); see also UPDATE #6, supra note 60, at 3, 63 (summarizing the
operation of the revenue limit).
258. Interview with Dr. Hoyt Watson, supra note 173; interview with James Damm, Assistant Superintendent for Highland Park I.S.D., in University Park, Tex. (Sept. 19, 1991) [hereinafter Interview With James Damm].
259. Property Tax Legislation, supra note 233, at 1,3. Since the 1991 school finance system
was declared unconstitutional in Edgewood III, the revenue limit's operation may forever remain a mystery if it is taken out of the new plan. See supra text accompanying notes 122-27.
260. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.009(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of May 27, 1991, § 2,
1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1475).
261. Id. § 16.009(d) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991, § I at 384).
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adjustment), (2) to this amount he adds the tier two cap of $700 calculated
by multiplying the $0.25 tax rate and the $28 yield per penny, and (3) the
total $3867 guaranteed revenue is multiplied by 110% for a per student program revenue cap of $4427.262 If the district's total state and local revenue,
excluding debt service, provides more than $4427, then that district would
263
have crossed the revenue limit for that year.
One district alone crossing the revenue limit would not activate any caps
on funding. Only when more than two percent of the state's students reside
264
in districts that have exceeded the revenue limits will the state intervene.
When the two percent threshold is crossed, no "school district may levy a
tax that will result in its exceeding the revenue limit in the following year"
except "[d]istricts already exceeding the limit do not have to lower taxes, but
may not increase them. '26 5 The exception allows the group of districts that
trigger the initiation of the revenue cap to maintain their level of funding
while those non-crossover districts must stay below the cap. 266 The "holdharmless" provision for the first districts to activate the revenue limit and
the Commissioner's discretionary role in setting the year's adjusted revenue
limit indicate that the provision's primary purpose is to control state equali267
zation costs rather than to achieve efficiency.
4. FinalAssessment of Efficiency
Out of twenty-one Dallas/Fort Worth area school districts in 1990-91
(Senate Bill 1 plan), the school tax rates varied from a low of $0.64 to a high
of $1.50, a difference of $0.86.269 In the new legislation's first year of operation, that difference in tax rates dropped to $0.55 with a range of $1.16 to
$1.71.26 9 In addition, the property wealth disparity between 1990-91 school
districts stood at 716-to-i whereas the CEDs dropped that ratio to 6-to-1.270
Further, at full implementation in 1994-95, the scheme would have featured
strong efficiency measures: (1) $1.00 of fully equalized local property taxes
by the operation of the CEDs, (2) $0.45 of optional local property taxes
guaranteed by the state to yield higher returns for property-poor districts,
(3) potential revenue limits on property-rich districts; and (4) a restrictive
property tax rate limit of $0.05 for local unequalized enrichment. Despite
difficulties with actual tax rates, 27 1 facilities funding, 272 and revenue limit
262. Edgewood Lawsuit, supra note 243, at 1.
263. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.009(d) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991, § 1,

1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 384).
264. Id.§ 16.009(e).
265. UPDATE #6, supra note 60, at 63-64.
266. Plaintiff-Intervenors,supra note 81, at 5.
267. See infra text accompanying notes 315-26 for discussion of the cost control aspect of a
revenue limit.
268. See Terry Box, "Robin Hood" Benefits Debated, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 9,

1991, at A6.
269. See id.
270. Texas Comptroller's Office, supra note 164, at 2.
271. See supra note 233.
272. See supra note 250.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

exceptions, 273 the legislature's 1991 school finance plan was a legitimate attempt to meet the efficiency mandate of "similar revenue per pupil at similar
levels of tax effort." '274
However, as will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, the
finance scheme adopts efficiency without embracing the second constitutional duty of "suitable provision. ' 27 5 New administrative costs, 276 greater
reliance on the local property tax, 277 and a substantial loss of local discretion
as to the level of enrichment funding lead to questions about the price paid
278
for efficiency at the expense of suitability.
III. SUITABLE PROVISION FOR EDUCATION FUNDING
In the search to find an efficient or fiscally neutral Texas public school
finance plan, the second constitutional duty of the legislature "to establish
and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient
system of public free schools" has taken second billing. 279 The issue of suitability has often been rephrased as a question of whether the finance system is
adequate to support the funding of public schools in their endeavor to ensure
"a general diffusion of knowledge. '280 The state's responsibility is to see
that "a thorough and efficient system be provided and substantiallyfinanced
through state revenue sources so that each student ... shall have access to
programs and services . . . appropriate to his or her educational needs
"281

Since the 1883 amendment to article VII, section 3, of the Texas Constitution, the financing of schools has been a shared responsibility of local and
state governments. 2 82 However, the proper use of local revenue has always
273. See supra text and accompanying notes 260-61.
274. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397.
275. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
276. Less than one-third of CEDs actually have wealthy districts that can raise a surplus to
be distributed to poor districts, making the CED functions insignificant but costly in the rest.
CED Watch: Initial Observations, NEWS & NOTES (Equity Center, Austin, Tex.) Aug. 1991,
at 5.

277. Local funds in 1991-92 cover 47% of the state's education cost whereas state funds
provide only 45%. SBOE Budget Shows Local Share Growing Fastest, NEWS & NOTES (Equity Center, Austin, Tex.) Sept. 1991, at 7 [hereinafter SBOE Budget].
278. The Edgewood III decision doomed the 1991 school finance legislation to a shelf life of
less than two years, losing effect sometime in 1993. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying
text. However, the analysis of the legislation is by no means moot since the court did not even
consider the "constitutional standard of efficiency" in its opinion and the legislature still must
try to create a finance scheme that achieves constitutional efficiency (fiscal neutrality) and
suitability (adequate funding) without violating other state constitutional provisions.
Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 494.
279. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § I (emphasis added).
280. Id.; see also Adequacy Analysis of Senate Bill 1, RESEARCH BRIEFS, (Tex. Educ.
Agency) Autumn 1990, at 5 (outlining adequacy criteria).
281. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.001 (Vernon 1991) (emphasis added).
282. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 396. See also BRADEN, supra note 219, at 518 (education
funding since 1883 has been a "joint responsibility of state and local authorities"); Parker,

supra note 8, at 895 (1883 amendment primarily concerned with adding a local source of
taxation to provide adequate funding for schools).
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been considered as a supplement to the state funding. 28 3 The Texas Supreme
Court emphasized the state's greater responsibility when it criticized the failure of Senate Bill 1 to "change the basic funding allocation, with approximately half of all education funds coming from local property taxes rather
than state revenue. ' 28 4 In short, constitutional, statutory, and court-interpreted law all stress the state's primary obligation to see to adequate as well
as efficient funding of the public schools.
Whether the state has made
"suitable provision" for education depends on two major concerns: (1) how
the state structures the system of taxation used for the support of schools,
and (2) what level of funding it establishes to cover the costs of educational
programs that meet the students' needs. The second issue raises political
questions about what is an adequate education, how much that adequate
education costs, how that cost should be determined, and what level of fiscal
commitment the state and localities wish to make to fund that cost. These
issues can best be decided by elected officials representing the interests of
their constituents. 28 5 However, these questions may never be asked if the
system of taxation is structured in such a way as to preclude any meaningful
attempts to set the appropriate level of funding. 28 6 Currently, the state's
revenue options and the limits placed on them predetermine the maximum
amount of state education funding, making academic any discussion about
what is adequate funding. 28 7 The legislature does not decide how much
money the state should contribute to public schools, rather the available revenue that can be raised through the current tax structure dictates the bottom
line. This obstacle needs to be removed by tax restructuring so that the
legislature can freely perform its constitutional duty to determine the necessary level of funding for the state's public schools. 28 8 Otherwise, the legislature will continue to avoid answering the important question concerning
how much money will be sufficient to provide suitable education. 28 9 As a
further complication, local districts are not likely to remedy deficiencies in
state education funding since the legislature seems determined to pass on the
costs and constraints of efficiency to the overburdened local property taxpayer. The remainder of this section will analyze the present tax structure,
283. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 396. See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.

284. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 496. The United States Supreme Court expressed a similar concern in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), by noting the
"need... for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too long and too heavily on the
local property tax." Id. at 58.
285. See generally Stern, supra note 8, at 998-1006 (analyzing the political question doctrine in the context of judicial challenges to state finance systems).
286. See Mumme v. Marrs, 40 S.W.2d 31, 36-37 (Tex. 1931).
287. Edgewood Lawsuit, supra note 243, at 2 (finding that the structure of a new finance
system with capped revenues, tax rate limitations, and greater local share funding will prevent
funding responses appropriate to changing needs of education).
288. See Billy Walker, True School Finance Reform Will Only Come Through State Tax

Restructuring,TEXAS LONE STAR, July 1991, at 36.
289. The character of the legislative duty means more than passively responding to the
circumstances of a system in place; rather it is "an affirmative duty to establish and provide for

the public free schools." Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 394 (emphasis added).
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the constitutional question of suitability arising therefrom, and possible alternatives to the tax structure.
A.

STATE AND LOCAL SHARE OF SCHOOL FUNDING

From 1989 to 1991, the state share of public education program funding
dropped from fifty-two percent to forty-five percent while the local share
rose from thirty-nine percent to forty-seven percent. 29° In 1991, actual tax
rates on local property in the Dallas/Fort Worth area increased from a pre29
vious average of $1.12 to $1.38 per one hundred dollars of property value. '
Further, the Legislative Budget Board projected a thirty-five percent or $2.2
billion increase in property taxes if Senate Bill 351 had lasted until full implementation in 1995.292 Obviously, the CEDs, in their role of equalization,
shift a greater burden of public education funding to the local revenue

source, the property tax. 293
B.

THE IMPACT OF THE LOCAL PROPERTY TAX

Property taxes do not correspond to a person's ability to pay. 294 In 1990,
a Texas family earning $10,000 contributed 7.6% of its income to state and
local taxes while a family earning $100,000 or more contributed 4.7% of its
income. 295 Texas' property tax is twenty percent above the national average,
contributing to a regressive tax structure that ranks forty-eighth out of the
296
fifty states.
The above figures do not reflect the increased property taxes that will fol290. SBOE Budget, supra note 277, at 7. The 1989 percentages result from the finance plan
enacted by Senate Bill 1019. See supra notes 39 and 186 and accompanying text. The 1991
percentages derive from the operation of Senate Bill 351's finance plan. See supra text accompanying notes 217-67.
291. See Box, supra note 268, at A6. In a Texas comptroller study, state local property tax
rates in 1991 rose from $1.06 to $1.20 per one hundred dollars of property value. A portion of
the increase can be attributed to the effect of increased residence homestead exemptions. Terrence Stutz, GOP says Richards to Blame for Steep School Tax Increases, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Dec. 7, 1991, at A42.
292. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON REVENUE, FINAL REPORT 9 (July 1991) [hereinafter
TASK FORCE]. The Task Force projected that local share yearly funding would rise from
$2.15 billion in 1990-91 to $5.17 billion in 1992-93, an increase of 141%. At the same time,
state foundation aid would rise from $5.73 billion to $6.96 billion, an increase of only 21%.
Legislature Passes AppropriationsBill in FinalHours, NEWS & NOTES (Equity Center, Austin,
Tex.) Aug. 1991, at 2.
293. See Plaintiff-Intervenors, supra note 81, at 5.
294. See TASK FORCE, supra note 292, at 24. Critics of the property tax cite two deficiencies: harshness on low income households and administrative costs. JOHNS ET AL., supra note
170, at 96. When a tax is based on a person's income, taxation levels adjust according to
whether the taxpayer's income increases or decreases. On the other hand, property taxes rise
with increases in the value of property regardless of whether the taxpayer's income increases,
decreases, or completely disappears. See Stubbs, supra note 8, at 315.
295. Lisbeth Lapari, Income Taxes - State Leaders Tiptoe Toward the I- Word, THE TEXAS
OBSERVER, July 12, 1991, at 4. "[T]he poorest income group in Texas pay[s] close to twice the
proportion of its income in taxes as the richest." TASK FORCE, supra note 292, at 24.
296. Lapari, supra note 295, at 4. Despite Texas being above average in property taxes, the
state in 1989 "ranked 34th among the states in total state and local taxes per capita." TASK
FORCE, supra note 292, at 25.
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low from Senate Bill 351.297 Governor Richard's Task Force on Revenue,
recognizing the inequities298 of the present tax structure, made the following
recommendation its number one objective: "[a]ny future change in the Texas
tax structure should begin with and proceed from the premise that local
property taxpayers need immediate relief, especially from the growing reliance on [sic] heavy burden of property taxes to support public education. '299
The Task Force feared that property tax "increases of this magnitude [under
Senate Bill 351 could lead to] a California-style 'Proposition 13' tax revolt in
3
Texas." oo
C.

TEXAS' OUTDATED TAX STRUCTURE

Texas relies on six major taxes to generate state revenue: the sales tax, the
motor fuels tax, the motor vehicle sales tax, the corporation franchise tax,
the natural gas production tax, and the oil production tax. 30' The general
sales tax and the oil and gas taxes have become less reliable due to the
changing makeup of the Texas economy. The sales tax was originally
designed to fall "heavily on tangible goods" as opposed to services. 30 2 With
the shift towards a greater service economy, the shrinking tax base from the
sale of goods yields less revenue. 30 3 More importantly, Texas, as a result of
the oil and gas industry collapse, lost a revenue source that ten years ago
provided twenty-eight percent of the state's taxes and now provides less than
eight percent. 3°4 While *he solution to the sales tax problem could be solved
by changing the way service providers are taxed in Texas, 305 the oil and gas
297. State Senator Carl Parker, chairman of the Education Committee, commented on the
tax impact of Senate Bill 351: "We may be 37th in education, but we're number one in property tax growth." David Armstrong, School FinanceBill Leaves All PartiesDisappointed,THE
TEXAS OBSERVER, June 28, 1991, at 11.

298. "Texas' tax system is generally not based on an ability to pay. No state tax in Texas
today is based on income, which is generally considered to be the best measure of the ability."
TASK FORCE, supra note 292, at 24. The Task Force analyzed Texas' current tax structure
using ten criteria of a good tax system: affordability, adequacy, equity, economic efficiency,
economic competitiveness, stability, simplicity, balance, broad base, and intergovernmental
linkages. Id. at 22-27. Based on these factors, not just the equity of the system, the Task Force
concluded that "[t]axpayers manifestly need relief" from property taxes. Id. at 28.
299. Id. at 33.
300. Id. at 9. On June 6, 1978 California voters passed a state constitutional amendment
that limited property taxes "to one percent of market value." PACE, supra note 174, at 4. As
a result, the funding and operation of public schools moved from a mix of local and state
discretion "to a state-dominated public education system." Id.
301. TASK FORCE, supra note 292, at 10. Education revenue, as opposed to state revenue,
comes primarily from regular legislative appropriations, local ad valorem property taxes, income from the permanent school fund, dedicated state occupation and motor fuels taxes, and
federal contributions. BRADEN, supra note 219, at 526. See also Texas Comptroller's Office,
supra note 164, at 6 (including a chart that breaks down the state, local, and federal funding of
Texas schools).
302. Taxing Choices: Revenue Alternatives Available to the Legislature, FISCAL NOTES
(Tex. Comptroller's Office), July 1991, at 4.
303. Id. Texas has the sixth highest sales tax rate among the states at 6.25%. Id. at 3. In
the last 6 years certain services have been added to the tax base, but "professional services
remain basically untaxed." Id.
304. TASK FORCE, supra note 292, at 1.
305. See Texas Comptroller's Office, supra note 164, at 4.
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revenue loss has no corresponding industry to pick up the slack created by

the slump. 3° 6 The heavy dependence on the oil and gas revenue is the cornerstone for an "antiquated tax structure" insensitive to "expanding revenue
30 7
needs."

The basic weakness of the Texas tax system arises from the imbalance
created by using sales and property taxes for revenue without the "third leg

of the.., stool", an income tax. 30 8 The United States Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations recommends equal reliance by the states on
those three tax sources.30 9 The Governor's Task Force attributed the
"chronic upward pressure on local property taxes" to the current imbalance
of the Texas tax system. 3 10 The majority of states recognize the need for a
balanced tax structure as nationwide state income taxes provide $80 billion,
or close to one third of the states' revenue. 3 11

Texas, with its present revenue options, does not have the "financial capacity . . . to provide adequate and equitable dollar support to public

schools. '3 12 The tax base consolidation of Senate Bill 351 continued the
state's reliance on the local property tax in order to fund costs beyond the
present system's limited means. 313 The result is "sky-high property taxes",
aptly described as "a recipe for fiscal distress for schools. ' 314
D.

THE INADEQUACY OF THE NEW FINANCE PLAN

The finance plan enacted by Senate Bill 351 and House Bill 2885 is "static

rather than dynamic. ' 3 15 At tier one, the state's basic allotment peaks at
$2800 by 1995 and "thereafter" remains unless the FSFBC 3 16 chooses to
adjust funding to meet the costs of education. 3 17 Similarly, the tier two
guaranteed yield levels off at $28 in 1995 with no plans for increases "thereafter. ' 318 At tier three, the full implementation $0.05 limit on unequalized
local enrichment will prevent districts that were once able to offset inade306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

See TASK FORCE, supra note 292, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.

311. Stubbs, supra note 8, at 315-16 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS STATE GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTION IN 1988, at vi (1990)).
312. Walker, supra note 288, at 36.

313. Id.
314. Id. The Lieutenant Governor of Texas, Bob Bullock, expressed his support for a personal and corporate income tax, noting that changing times require a switch to a "modern,
efficient, and fair tax system." Bob Bullock, Hand in Hand-Property Tax Relief Income Tax
Can Work to Meet Finance Needs, TEXAS LONE STAR, Apr.-May 1991, at 13, 14.
315. Edgewood Lawsuit, supra note 243, at 2.
316. See supra notes 204-16 and accompanying text for past criticisms of the FSFBC's
discretionary operation.
317. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.101 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Act of Apr. 11, 1991, 72nd
Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 389). Although the basic allotment increases
by $600 during the four year implementation of the Act, the CED tax rate for districts' local
share of the foundation program also increases by $0.28. Id. § 16.252.
318. Id. § 16.302(a).
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quate state funding from suitably supplementing their program. 3 19 Further,
the revenue limit 320 may help alleviate funding disparities at tier two, 32 1 but
it also caps local school districts at a dated estimate of what constitutes adequate funding for educating children. 322 In short, the 1991 school finance
legislation mixes together ingredients for a truly inadequate funding system:
(1) predetermine future levels of state guaranteed funding, 323 (2) give a small
group of elected state officials full discretion in determining whether changes
in the cost of education necessitate adjustments to the guaranteed funding, 324 (3) shift the costs of achieving a fiscally neutral system to the local
property taxpayer, 325 and (4) substantially restrict attempts of local school
32 6
districts to account for inadequate state funding levels.
Frustration, resentment, and attempts to bypass the restrictions promise
to be the products of the plan's inadequacy. For some, the motivating logic
for the change is that if everybody cannot have an adequate amount of funding then nobody should. 327 This feeling can lead to a negative commitment
to public education. Higher local taxes yielding less returns will discourage
taxpayers from agreeing to increases in the already burdensome property
tax. 328 Instead, communities and individuals may look for escape routes.
319. Id. § 20.09(a) (Act of May 27, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 391, § 12, 1991 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1475, 1481). The $0.05 limit is arrived at by subtracting the school district's tier two tax
rate of $0.45 from the district's maximum allowable tax rate of $0.50. Id. § 16.303 (Apr. 11,

1991, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, 404).
320. Id. § 16.009 (Act of May 27, 1991, § 2, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1475, 1475).
321. See supra text accompanying notes 257-67 for an interpretation of how the revenue

limit would have operated.
322. Edgewood Lawsuit, supra note 243, at 2. Estimates for the 1996-97 school year (factoring in a 5% increase in costs per year) show 17% of Texas students would have been in
districts with their revenue limited. Id.

323. If past comparisons to average nationwide spending on education is any indication,
then Texas guaranteed funding will be not only inflexible but deficient. In the 1990-91 school
year, estimates showed Texas spending $3966 per student compared to a national average
exceeding $5000. Education Reform: PreparingOur Childrenfor the Future, FISCAL NOTES,
(Tex. Comptroller's Office) March 1991, at 10. This ranks Texas last among the largest ten
states in education spending. The ranking partially stems from Texas' status as a state with a
large percentage of school-age children residing in poor households. Id. at 5-6.
324. Out of the eight major state spending areas for the last ten years, education ranked
seventh in average annual growth. TASK FORCE, supra note 292, at 8. Since 1980-81, the
revenue per student in Texas has fallen $135 constant dollars. Per Capita Revenue Shows
Slight Gain in Real Dollars in 1989-90, RESEARCH BRIEFS, (Tex. Educ. Agency),
Spring/Summer 1991, at 4. The past conduct of the legislature indicates that higher adjustments will be an unlikely proposition.
325. Ron Wood, business manager for Irving I.S.D., expressed frustration over the state's
maneuvering: "Overall, Dallas County lost $85 million in state funds to poor districts in south
Texas. The only person that gained in all this is the state legislator and he could say, 'We kept
your state taxes down. We didn't bring in an income tax this year.'" Box, supra note 268, at
A6.
326. The California experience with severe restrictions on local funding has resulted in at
least two negative consequences: local funding no longer "buffers[s]" state revenue drops due
to downturns in the economy and the loss of competition among districts tends to decrease the
amount of funds committed to public education. Picus, supra note 174, at 45.
327. The resentful attitude against recapture fuels commentary: "The court's decision is
supposed to be a victory for minorities. But is taking money away from the education of black
kids in Dallas and spending it on the education of brown kids in San Antonio a big step
forward for minorities?" Curtis, supra note 180, at 12.
328. Yudof, supra note 177, at 592. See also KOZOL, supra note 1, at 221 (the California
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One option for some districts will be to seek community contributions to a
"tax-exempt foundation" which funnels money into the district's available
revenue. 329 Alternatively, concerned parents may increasingly seek out private schools, pushing their legislators to increase financial incentives for en330
tering private schools at the expense of public school funding.
E.

THE LOCAL CHOICE TO ENRICH

Local districts argued in the past that the state should not interfere with
their funding efforts because it would compromise their local control of education. 33' Increased state power over the purse strings would lead to greater
state regulation of local affairs. Such arguments ran contrary to the definition of a local school district as "a political subdivision of the state created
for the purpose of the local administration of the state's public school system."' 332 With the current degree of state regulation of curriculum,

ministration, 334

333

ad-

instruction,33 5

and
the idea of a partially autonomous school
district is, as described by Governor Richards, a "myth. '3 36 The degree of
local control granted to school districts by the state varies with the state's
views on the value of centralized regulation, not the districts' fiscal independence. 337 A local school district in Texas could be one hundred percent
fiscally autonomous and still be subject to state regulation of the district's
operations.
The choice to enrich, however, should not be easily dismissed as strictly
within the state's power since the issue of the amount of school funding can
be distinguished from issues concerning regulation of districts' operations.
experience shows that taxpayers will opt for a mediocre school system when the costs of excellence for all are viewed as too high).
329. At least one district openly acknowledges the feasibility of the tax-exempt foundation
for its school district. Interview with James Damm, supra note 258.
330. One author argues that voucher plans and educational choice offer the true answer to
the state's efforts to educate children. He accurately reflects a major criticism of the proposed
funding alternative: "The minority fear of vouchers is that if parents are allowed to supplement the state voucher with their funds for education, unequal educational opportunity will
result and there will be inflation in the cost of education so that the poor will still receive the
worst education." Parker, supra note 8, at 916.
331. The local school district derives its authority from state delegation, not a constitutional grant of specific power. BRADEN, supra note 219, at 515.
332. Id.
333. E.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.01 (Vernon 1991) (state controls textbook adoption process); § 21.101(c) (state writes specific, mandated essential elements for all subjects at
all grade levels).
334. E.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.301 (Vernon 1991) (guidelines for student expulsion); § 21.751(a) (central education agency oversees accreditation of school districts);
§ 21.920(b) (no-pass, no-play rule for student athletes).
335. E.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.032 (Vernon 1991) (state regulates the education
and certification of teachers); § 13.302 (state controls teacher appraisal process through an
evaluation instrument with precise and detailed performance categories).
336. Wong, supra note 36, at 16.
337. Currently, the trend is towards decentralizing the "rigid enforcement structure that is
stifling creativity and local initiative." How to "redirect, restructure, revitalize" TEA,
STRAIGHT TALK, (Association of Texas Professional Educators, Austin, Tex.) Oct./Nov.
1991, at 1 (quoting advisory group report prepared for Commissioner of Education, Lionel
Meno).
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The claim is not that the state will use a funding scheme to dominate local
decisions on school operations but that the school district has a right to
supplement state funding levels to meet its view of adequacy. The current
finance scheme, with the recapture and revenue limit provisions, significantly
curtails the ability of local school districts to supplement their educational
resources beyond state determined levels of adequacy. 338 The reason behind
the limit is lack of state money to meet the levels of the wealthy districts. If
the state allowed enrichment to proceed unchecked, then the cost of efficiency or fiscal neutrality would exceed its funding capacity. 339 The finance
system is caught in a "Catch-22" constitutional dilemma. The state can afford efficiency only if it controls the revenue levels of the states' districts. In
controlling those levels, it makes what many districts view as an inadequate
34°
provision for "a general diffusion of knowledge."
F. THE WAY OUT
The key to having the opportunity to efficiently and adequately provide
for public education in Texas is to restructure the state's tax system to include a personal and corporate income tax. The Governor's Task Force on
Revenue considered the benefits of a personal income tax at a rate of five
percent with a $4000 personal exemption. 341 Further, the Task Force
34 2
looked into replacing the franchise tax with a 7.5% corporate income tax.
In the end, nine out of fourteen committee members voted for the two income taxes as a way to provide local property tax relief and generate needed
levels of state revenue. 343 Furthermore, two members of the committee
wrote letters contained in the report's appendix favoring the personal income tax and at least some form of a new business tax, notwithstanding their
344
nay votes on the overall recommendations.
Unfortunately, the political hostility toward a state income tax in Texas
continues. Comptroller Sharp summed up the knee-jerk reaction by stating
that he believed "the Capitol will shrivel up and fall in before the House of
Representatives approves an income tax."1345 One committee member of the
Task Force described present recommendations for an income tax as out of
338. A Wisconsin supreme court case, Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 151 (Wis. 1976) involved a challenge to a recapture scheme "designed to ensure equal tax dollars for education
from equal tax effort." Betsy Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation: A
Commentary, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1099, 1130 (citing Buse, 247 N.W.2d at 151). The court invalidated the plan by finding that local districts have a constitutional right "to provide educational
opportunities over and above those required by the state and they retain the power to raise and
spend revenue." Id. (quoting Buse, 247 N.W.2d at 151).

339. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 500.
340. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
341. TASK FORCE, supra note 292, at C7.

342. Id.
343. Id. at 34. Over thirty Texas organizations expressed support for the proposed income
tax during the Task Force's hearings, including the League of Women voters, the Texas Conference of Churches, the Texas Center for Policy Studies, the Texas Trial Lawyers Association,
and the Texas Populist Alliance. Id. at 29.
344. Id. at All, A18.
345. Nancy Cotton, The Man with the Plan: Sharp Discusses His New Ideas as Comptroller, TEXAS LONE STAR, June 1991, at 18, 19.
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touch with political realities or an "ivory tower" mentality. 346 Another
member felt, however, that state leaders "must challenge the conventional
wisdom and offer a vision that changes that fundamental order if necessary."' 347 Under a personal and business income tax model, the $10,000 income family would be taxed at 8.27% in comparison to the $100,000
family's 7.38%.348 The taxes for those two families would raise an additional $2736 in state revenue with the $10,000 family limited to paying only
$61 of the increase. 349 Consequently, the state would have sufficient revenue
to solve the funding dilemma of an efficient and suitable provision for the
schools without overburdening families with insufficient income.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Since Edgewood I, the Texas Supreme Court has told the Texas legislature
to make the public school finance system efficient (fiscally neutral) in accordance with the Texas Constitution. Edgewood II instructed the Texas legislature that adding more money to a system founded on tax base disparities
fails to make an inefficient system efficient. Edgewood III protected the local
property taxpayer from having to bear the costs of efficiency without some
degree of local control and voter approval of the property taxes levied by a
state-created taxing entity (the CED).
Throughout the school finance battle the focus has revolved around the
mandate of efficiency and how to raise the funds for a system that should
give substantially equal access to school funding at similar levels of tax effort. But slightly below the surface boils the interrelated and central issue of
what constitutes adequate funding for public schools in Texas. When the
property-poor school districts originally brought suit, they essentially said:
"We do not have enough money to provide a suitable education for our children, property-rich school districts do, and therefore we want to be funded
like they are." The answer has been so far: "The system is unfair and unconstitutional, but who is going to foot the bill for putting property-poor
school districts on par with property-rich school districts?"
If local taxes finance the equalization, then property taxpayers will be
stretched beyond their limits and pushed to the point of taxpayer revolt.
Alternatively, the local school boards may gauge the taxpayer disapproval in
advance and opt for less than adequate funding to avoid any voter backlash.
Either way, the increasing reliance on the local property tax to fund Texas
public schools threatens to undermine the goal of creating a constitutional
finance system. Today the system is inefficient for all but adequate for some.
Tomorrow the system could be relatively efficient for all but adequate for
none.
The solution lies in the state recognizing that efficient and adequate fund346.
347.
348.
without
349.

TASK FORCE, supra note 292, at A 16.
Id. at All.
Id.at F13. See supra text and accompanying note 295 on the percentage tax burdens
the income taxes.
See id. at FI, F13.
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ing cannot be achieved through reliance on overtaxed revenue sources.
Texas' out-dated, regressive tax structure no longer generates sufficient revenue to fund the education needs of all the students of the state. The misuse
of the local property tax not only creates disparities in funding but places
unfair burdens on low income taxpayers. A state income tax could solve
both problems by providing a progressive source of revenue and relieving the
state's reliance on the local property tax. While these ideas are not new,
they need to be given a new, objective presentation to the taxpayers of the
state. For those who believe adequate funding is one ingredient in providing
a quality education for all the students of the state, inclusion of the income
tax to raise the increased financial need is preferable to greater dependence
on an antiquated tax structure. 350 Without the additional revenue, an efficient and suitable public school system will truly be an impossible dream.

350. In an extensive study of the Texas public school system and the impact of disparate
funding, the most recent research shows that money alone does make a difference in student
performance because it can be used to attract higher quality teachers and retain them as they
increase in experience and learning. See Ronald F. Ferguson, Paying for Public Education:
New Evidence on How and Why Money Matters, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 465 (1991).

